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1 Introduction 
1.1 General Motivation 
The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 is an alarming example of the consequences stemming 
from managerial entrenchment and corporate behaviour not compliant with U.S. policy makers’ 
regulations or good corporate governance practises. Considering that the crisis was triggered 
by the burst of a housing bubble and that the REIT industry has experienced significant market 
capitalisation growth1 ever since, REIT management has to be aware of its past, current and 
future responsibility and take appropriate action to prevent any repetition of incentive 
misalignment and short-term risk taking from reoccurring again. As a result of the crisis, investor 
sensitivity towards corporate governance and transparency problems has intensified. Hence, a 
growing investment community now seeks to generate positive social and sustainable impacts 
by integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors, alongside profits, into their 
decision-making (PWC, 2016; Responsible Investment Association, 2017). With respect to 
growing investor demand for ESG factors and overall growth of the REIT industry, the 
implementation of well-developed corporate governance mechanisms will become increasingly 
important for REIT management. These efforts have been fostered early on by U.S. policy 
makers with the adoption of reforms such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and the ‘Say-on-
Pay’2 rule of 2011 to strengthen shareholder rights and ensure access to as well as quality of 
substantial investor information. Several studies on listed real estate companies already provide 
evidence that enhanced corporate governance is associated with better company performance 
(Bauer, Eichholtz, & Kok, 2010; Feng, Ghosh, & Sirmans, 2005; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003; Kohl 
& Schaefers, 2012).  
In the context of corporate governance, a large and growing stream of finance literature 
investigates how women in high-level leadership roles affect performance. The disadvantages 
and advantages of having a gender-diverse board can be explained by means of 
similarity/attraction theory and stakeholder theory. Similarity/attraction theory argues that 
greater diversity is a potential source of intragroup conflict (Lau & Murnighan, 1998) and 
reduced group cohesion, since the level of trust and loyalty are likely to depend on the similarity 
of board members (Byrne, 1971; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). In turn, stakeholder theory states 
that firms need to cooperate with their stakeholders and consider stakeholders’ needs within 
                                                     
1 The market capitalisation growth for US Equity REITs amounted to 295% in the period of 2009-2018  
   (National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 2019). 
2 For further information on the ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule see: https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178-secg.htm. 
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the management decision-making process (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Thus, 
developing good relations with female stakeholders and matching board composition to the 
diversity of customers, shareholders and employees can create a competitive advantage (Carter, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). In the US, the number of women in senior leadership positions has 
been increasing slowly compared to some European countries, which adopted quota 
legislations (e.g. Germany, Norway, France). Due to the absence of female quota in the US 
market, the US REIT sector offers an unbiased setting for analysing the link between gender 
diversity and performance. Considering the unique legal circumstances of the REIT sector, the 
effectiveness of both corporate governance and the impact of gender-diverse boards is 
expected to differ from that of companies from other industries. Since no five or fewer 
shareholders are entitled to own 50% of the company, extensive external monitoring through 
large blockholders is impaired with respect to REITs (Feng et al., 2005), and internal monitoring 
structures gain importance. Hence, gender diversity may be considered as a proxy for enhanced 
corporate social responsibility (Boulouta, 2013; Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee, 2015), which may 
ultimately increase investor demand for those REITs (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Reguera-
Alvarado, De Fuentes, & Laffarga, 2017). If diverse boards enhance internal monitoring (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009), gender diversity in senior leadership positions may be a decisive corporate 
governance factor within REITs, for which extensive external monitoring through large 
blockholders is weakened. 
With regard to monitoring and control of REIT management, compensation can be a key 
determinant in aligning the interests of REIT management and shareholders. As REIT 
shareholders tend to be widely dispersed, agency problems arise, since investors cannot 
effectively control the daily operations of the company. Agency theory argues that 
compensation encourages executive directors to act in the interest of the company’s 
shareholders, suggesting that CEO/executive compensation should be determined primarily by 
company performance (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managerial power 
theory, however, states that powerful CEOs and entrenched executives have a significant 
impact on board member decisions, and ultimately on the level of their own compensation 
(Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002). In the light of the devastating consequences of the financial 
crisis of 2007/2008, which revealed that managers had been rewarded for excessive short-term 
risk taking (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Spamann, 2010; Cheng, Hong, & Scheinkman, 2015; Clementi, 
Cooley, Richardson, & Walter, 2009), a fundamental concern is the degree to which executives 
and especially CEOs are held accountable by investors for the remuneration packages they 
receive (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). As a result of the crisis, the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted reforms to reduce managerial entrenchment. With 
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the so-called ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule, the SEC grants shareholders an advisory vote on executive 
compensation, thereby providing a framework which ties compensation to long-term company 
performance, and ultimately increases transparency. 
In this vein, the SEC’s mission is to ensure that investors have access to fundamental information 
about any firm in which they invest.3 As mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC 
has to review the periodic financial statements of listed companies at least every three years 
(Bozanic, Dietrich, & Johnson, 2017). Within this procedure, the SEC may identify potential 
deficiencies such as inconsistencies between the funds from operations (FFO) disclosed by the 
REIT and NAREIT’s definition. Once any inconsistencies have been discovered, the SEC sends a 
comment letter to the REIT’s management requesting clarification, more discussion and/or 
improvements in future filings. Such reviews can be considered a form of external, involuntary 
and independent auditing of firms. It is commonly argued that additional or enhanced 
disclosure improves the information environment between a firm and its investors (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Kohl & Schaefers, 2012; Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000; Welker, 1995). If the investment community gains new decision-relevant information 
about a REIT from these SEC comment letter reviews, such external audits may be a powerful 
tool for investment and pricing decisions. 
Both, non-compliance with regulatory provisions during the financial crisis and literature on 
corporate governance and disclosure, show that corporate governance-related topics pose a 
major challenge to REIT management. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to evaluate corporate 
governance mechanisms, namely gender diversity, pay-for-performance contracts and 
enhanced disclosure, from an investor’s point of view. In a US REIT context, the three articles 
of this dissertation provide first insight into: (1) the determinants which explain the presence of 
women on the board of directors, and the resulting gender diversity / performance relationship; 
(2) the link between management compensation arrangements and sustainable company 
performance during and after the financial crisis; (3) the REIT-specific content of SEC comment 
letters and their impact on the information environment of REIT investors. 
This dissertation sheds light on how a REIT’s management should position and best prepare 
itself in order to detect and cope with the aforementioned challenges. Further, these insights 
will guide REIT investors and U.S. policy makers to more appropriately evaluate transparency, 
disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms.  
                                                     
3 Further information on the mission, purpose and organisational structure, see SEC website on “What We Do”: 
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
The following section contains an overview of the research questions investigated in this 
dissertation with regard to the three articles. 
 
 
Paper 1: Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: 
Evidence from US REITs 
 
 Does gender diversity in senior leadership positions constitute a corporate governance 
factor?  
 What are the factors that determine the likelihood of a REIT having a female director 
on the board of directors? 
 Does female representation in executive and non-executive board positions impact on 
the financial performance of REITs? 
 Does female leadership have a greater impact on the accounting results (FFO/SHARE) 
of a company, or rather on market performance (PRICE/NAV)? 
 Is there a critical threshold of female representation, represented by a U-shaped 
relationship between gender diversity and performance? 
 Are there real estate sector differences concerning gender diversity and its impact on 
performance? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
5 
 
Paper 2: The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US 
REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
 
 Did the ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule, which was introduced after the financial crisis of 2007/2008, 
strengthen the pay-for-performance link? 
 Do well-regarded corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. independent shareholders) 
constrain excessive compensation arrangements? 
 Is CEO/executive director compensation determined by performance and/or managerial 
entrenchment? 
 Do CEOs and executive directors exert significant influence on the level of their own 
compensation and pay sensitivity to performance? 
 Are there striking differences between the determinants of short-term cash, long-term 
total and incentive-based equity compensation packages? 
 Are compensation packages adequately structured with regard to long-term 
performance and value-driven growth? 
 
 
Paper 3: SEC Comment Letters and Information Asymmetries in 
REITs 
 
 Does the SEC comment letter review enhance the information environment for REIT 
investors? 
 Which types of comments (e.g. asset-, transaction-specific issues) are most frequently 
received by REITs? 
 Does the SEC particularly scrutinise REIT-specific non-GAAP metrics like FFO? 
 Which types of comments have the strongest impact on the reduction of REIT 
information asymmetries, as measured by the bid-ask spread? 
 Is a higher complexity of SEC comment letter correspondences (e.g. number of 
comments) related to a stronger impact on the REIT information environment? 
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1.3 Course of Analysis 
The following synopsis provides an overview of the three research articles with regard to their 
originality and research design, authorship, current publication status, and conference 
presentations. 
 
Paper 1: Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: 
Evidence from US REITs 
 
This article is the first to identify the determinants which explain the presence of women on the 
board of directors, and to study the relationship between gender diversity and financial 
performance in a US REIT context. A two-stage Heckman (1976) approach is applied to a unique 
panel dataset of 112 US Equity REITs over the period 2005-2015. The findings constitute a 
strong case for gender diversity by demonstrating that investors consider female leadership as 
a signal for enhanced corporate governance and develop a stronger demand for REITs which 
promote gender diversity. 
 
 
Authors: Liesa Schrand, Claudia Ascherl, Wolfgang Schaefers 
Submission to: Journal of Property Research (JPR) 
Current Status: published in 2018, DOI: 10.1080/09599916.2018.1549587 
 
This paper was presented at the 2017 Annual Conference of the American Real Estate Society 
(ARES) in San Diego, USA and at the 2017 Annual Conference of the European Real Estate 
Society (ERES) in Delft, Netherlands. 
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Paper 2: The Determinants of Executive Compensation in  
US REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
 
This article investigates whether REIT CEO and executive director compensation packages are 
determined by performance and/or by managerial entrenchment. Using a panel data fixed-
effects methodology on a sample of 83 REITs in the period of 2006-2015, this study is the first 
to systematically assess the arrangement of REIT CEO and executive director compensation 
contracts after the financial crisis, while considering the ‘Say-on-Pay’ reform of 2011. The 
results show that there was no pay-performance link during the crisis. However, after the 
financial crisis, a strong link between remuneration and corporate success was identified. 
 
 
Authors: Claudia Ascherl, Liesa Schrand, Wolfgang Schaefers, Sofia Dermisi 
Submission to: Journal of Property Research (JPR) 
Current Status: under review 
 
This paper was presented at the 2018 Annual Conference of the American Real Estate Society 
(ARES) in Bonita Springs, USA and at the 2018 Annual Conference of the European Real Estate 
Society (ERES) in Reading, United Kingdom. 
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Paper 3: SEC Comment Letters and Information Asymmetries  
in REITs 
 
This study is the first to investigate the impact of SEC comment letters on information 
asymmetries, as measured by the bid-ask spread, in the REIT market. The dataset of the 
empirical analysis comprises 85 REITs that received 452 comment letters with 2,846 comment 
letter issues on their annual financial statements (10-K Form) over the period of 2006-2016. 
The results show that SEC comment letters, as a form of external audit, indeed enhance the 
information environment of REIT investors, as they reveal deficiencies in REIT disclosure with 
regard to asset-specific (e.g. leasing), transaction-specific (e.g. joint ventures), liquidity and 
performance measurement (e.g. FFO and AFFO) issues. 
 
 
Authors: Liesa Schrand, Julia Freybote, Wolfgang Schaefers 
Submission to: Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics (JREFE) 
Current Status: under review 
 
This paper was presented at the 2018 Annual Conference of the American Real Estate Society 
(ARES) in Bonita Springs, USA and at the 2018 Annual Conference of the European Real Estate 
Society (ERES) in Reading, United Kingdom. 
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2 Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: Evidence from US 
REITs 
 
Abstract 
 
Our paper is the first to identify the determinants which explain the presence of women on 
the board of directors, and to study the relationship between gender diversity and financial 
performance in a US REIT context. We apply a two-stage Heckman (1976) approach to a 
unique panel dataset of 112 US Equity REITs over the period 2005-2015. Our results show 
that a REIT’s likelihood of having a woman on the board of directors depends strongly on 
board attributes. Especially institutional investors support gender-diverse leadership teams, 
which might be driven by the perception that women contribute to an enhanced internal 
monitoring in the REIT context, in which external monitoring is weakened through ownership 
restrictions. We find evidence of a U-shaped relationship between gender diversity in 
executive positions and price per net asset value (PRICE/NAV). In the case of REITs, a critical 
mass of female executives is reached at approximately 30% representation. This finding holds 
especially for real estate sectors with a strong consumer orientation and a high proportion of 
women in the workforce, such as retail and health care. Our performance analysis 
demonstrates that gender diversity has a positive effect on market performance (PRICE/NAV), 
but not on operating performance (FFO/SHARE). 
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2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a decisive investment trend towards socially responsible 
investments (PWC, 2016). Alongside financial returns, numerous investors now seek to 
generate a positive social and sustainable impact, by applying a so-called ‘Impact Investing’ 
strategy (Responsible Investment Association, 2017). As one example of an impact investment 
opportunity, State Street Global Advisors created the SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF (ticker: 
SHE) in 2016. With the aim of increasing gender diversity in companies’ senior leadership, this 
exchange-traded fund (ETF) invests exclusively in US large-cap companies with a relatively 
high proportion of women in both executive and non-executive positions.  
However, increasing the number of women in senior leadership positions has been slow in 
the United States, compared to some European countries, which have seen dramatic changes, 
due to quota legislation (e.g. Norway, Spain, France) or other regulatory disclosure 
requirements or recommendations (e.g. Austria, United Kingdom). Recent data shows that 
5.2% of US companies in the S&P 500 are led by a woman Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
21.2% of corporate board seats are occupied by female directors (Catalyst, 2017). Since the 
US market has no quota legislation, the US REIT sector offers an unbiased setting for analysing 
the link between gender diversity and REIT performance.  
The significant market capitalisation growth of 194% for US Equity REITs within our sample 
period (2005-2015) means that REITs have become a stand-alone asset class for institutional 
investors (National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 2016), implying that well-
developed corporate governance mechanisms within REITs will become increasingly 
important. Considering the unique legal setting of the REIT sector, we expect both the 
effectiveness of corporate governance, and the impact of gender diversity on REITs, to differ 
from other C corporations. Since the five largest REIT shareholders cannot own more than 
50% of the company, extensive external monitoring through large blockholders is impaired 
with respect to REITs, and internal monitoring structures gain importance. For example, 
Ghosh & Sirmans (2003) provide evidence that weak corporate governance, as measured by 
long CEO tenure and a duality of the CEO and chairman position, adversely affects 
performance. Feng et al. (2005) find that companies with good governance (small boards, 
majority outside directors and a separated CEO/chairman position) perform better on average, 
although the effect is only significant for the best and worst boards. Shakir (2008) 
demonstrates that investors in listed property firms in Malaysia prefer small boards with a 
higher share of executive directors. Similarly, the findings of Kohl & Schaefers (2012) show 
that market participants investing in European listed real estate companies appreciate smaller 
Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: Evidence from US REITs 
13 
boards, higher levels of ownership by the executive management and greater transparency 
of real-estate-specific disclosure. Bauer et al. (2010) find that REITs scoring high in a 
governance rating are associated with better performance, but this only holds for REITs with 
low payout ratios.  
In summary, gender-diverse boards may be considered as a proxy for enhanced corporate 
social responsibility (Boulouta, 2013; Harjoto et al., 2015), which may ultimately increase the 
demand for those REITs (Bear et al., 2010; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017). If diverse boards 
enhance internal monitoring (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), we expect women to improve 
performance especially within REITs, where extensive external monitoring through large 
blockholders is weakened. Moreover, we expect that female board members are especially 
important for the financial performance of REITs with a high proportion of women in the 
workforce or strong consumer-orientation, like retail and health care. Within the REIT 
corporate governance literature, we aim to identify the determinants of female representation 
in leadership positions, and to analyse the relationship between gender diversity and financial 
performance, by applying a two-stage Heckman (1976) approach to a unique panel dataset 
of 112 US Equity REITs over the period 2005-2015. 
Previous gender studies commonly measure firm performance in terms of return on assets 
(ROA) and Tobin’s Q (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 
2010; Terjesen et al., 2015). However, these performance measures are not reliable for REITs, 
since their business is long-term investment in real estate assets. The accounting policy for 
real estate assets is the historical cost method under US-GAAP. Hence, ROA and Tobin’s Q do 
not reflect the market value of real estate assets, since the balance sheet item ‘total assets’ 
reflects depreciated book values. For analysing gender diversity in a real estate context, it is 
necessary to apply real estate performance measures, so that we apply funds from operations 
per share (FFO/SHARE) and price per net asset value (PRICE/NAV).  
Our methodology includes two steps. First, we derive the factors that determine the likelihood 
of a REIT having a female director on the board. Second, we analyse the gender diversity / 
performance link within REITs. The results of our first step regression show, that gender 
diversity within the board of directors depends substantially on board attributes and less on 
firm characteristics and macroeconomic circumstances. Specifically, institutional investors 
have a positive impact on female board appointments. Due to REIT ownership restriction, 
institutional investors may expect women to contribute to an enhanced internal monitoring 
and thus do support gender-diverse leadership teams.  
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The performance analysis demonstrates that gender diversity has a positive effect on market 
performance (PRICE/NAV), but not on accounting-based performance (FFO/SHARE). Hence, 
investor perceptions drive the positive effect of female directors on performance. However, 
gender diversity has no impact on operating performance. Intuitively, these results make good 
economic sense and constitute a strong case for gender diversity. Assuming women and men 
to be equally qualified, the impact of an increased share of women within REITs on financial 
realties like FFO/SHARE should be insignificant. However, stock market prices are also 
determined by soft factors and future expectations. Therefore, a positive impact of gender 
diversity on PRICE/NAV might signal for enhanced corporate governance mechanisms and 
social responsibility.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The related literature and hypothesis 
Section discusses the existing research on the gender diversity / performance relationship and 
develops testable hypotheses for gender diversity within REITs. The methodology Section 
considers the sample design, variables from the multivariate analysis and the model 
specification. In the results Section, we report univariate statistics, present results from the 
multivariate analysis and discuss the implications of the results. The final Section concludes. 
 
 
2.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
An all-inclusive definition of diversity not only covers gender diversity, but also the dimensions 
of race, nationality, religion and education. Empirical evidence of diversity shows, that each 
dimension has a unique impact on group outcome or rather on performance (Bell et al., 2011; 
Harrison & Klein, 2007). Nonetheless, we focus on gender diversity for reasons discussed 
earlier in the introduction.  
A large and growing stream of finance literature investigates how women in high-level 
leadership roles affect a firm’s performance, but the empirical evidence on the relationship is 
ambiguous. Several economic reasons promote the advancement of women in management 
positions. Among these arguments is the fact that only a small number of women occupy a 
corporate board seat, which implies that there is a huge, untapped pool of board candidates 
or rather underutilised female talents (Simpson et al., 2010). If almost only men are considered 
as potential board candidates, the quality of board appointments may be impaired, since 
women’s abilities and knowledge are not taken into consideration sufficiently. Females in 
senior positions may serve as role models, and thus encourage women in lower positions to 
strive for higher career levels (Burke & McKeen, 1996; Hillman et al., 2007). Thus, the 
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existence of female role models is of particular importance to company mentoring and career-
support programs for women employees. 
The advantages of having a gender-diverse board can be explained in consideration of 
decision-making and stakeholder theory. Decision making theory suggests, that with 
women’s distinct attributes, boardrooms gain an increased variety of perspectives and a 
broader range of knowledge, skills and experience, which fosters creativity and innovation as 
well as the quality of decision-making (Cox & Blake, 1991; Robinson & Dechant, 1997). Thus, 
narrow, monolithic group thinking and self-assurance, rather likely in homogeneous boards, 
can be reduced by considering women’s divergent views and their different approach to 
complex issues (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). With regard to the multifaceted problems 
in the real estate industry, a female perspective can be a valuable contrast to that of male 
counterparts. Therefore, the inclusion of varying perspectives, may be especially important 
for real estate company sectors, which are particularly consumer-orientated (e.g. retail), or 
for those sectors where women represent the majority of the workforce (e.g. heath care).  
In turn, stakeholder theory argues that firms need to cooperate with their stakeholders and 
consider stakeholder’s needs within the management decision-making process (Clarkson, 
1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1983). Thus, developing good relations with 
women stakeholders and matching board composition to the diversity of customers, 
shareholders and employees, can create a competitive advantage (Carter et al., 2003). 
Appointments of the women stakeholder group, may also be an asset for the corporate 
image. The increasing popularity of socially responsible investments shows that investors do 
pay attention to companies’ ethical behaviour and gender diversity in their investment 
decisions. Bear et al. (2010) and Reguera-Alvarado et al. (2017) show that by considering 
women in high-level leadership roles as a positive investment factor, investors raise the 
demand for shares of highly gender-diverse companies and ultimately raising their price. 
Based on these theories in favour of a higher female representation in top management 
positions, several non-REIT studies have found a positive impact of the percentage of women 
on the board of directors on various performance measures (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; 
Carter et al., 2003; Terjesen et al., 2015). However, the positive effects of gender diversity 
may be neutralised by certain disadvantages of heterogeneous teams. Greater diversity is a 
potential source of intragroup conflict (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). A clash of divergent opinions 
and more critical questioning may lead to prolonged and less efficient board meetings, 
resulting in delayed decision-making. Reduced board effectiveness may also result from 
reduced group cohesion, since the level of trust and loyalty are likely to depend on the 
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similarity of board members (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Accordingly, female representation 
in top management teams may have no significant effect (Carter et al., 2010; Rose, 2007) or 
even a negative effect on financial performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Shrader, Blackburn, 
& Iles, 1997). Within the REIT corporate governance literature, there is only one paper by 
Dimovski et al. (2014) investigating the impact of female directors on the board of directors 
of 37 Australian REITS from 2008-2011. Their findings show that female directors are not 
statistically related to Tobin’s Q, or to ROA. However, they neglect the possible endogenous 
relationship between performance and gender diversity.  
These mixed results of previous studies can be explained in various ways. First, these studies 
differ in their sample design, such as time period, examined countries and industry sectors. 
Second, there is no uniform statistical method4 applied by all studies and third, there is no 
identical measurement of performance5 or gender6 diversity. 
Apart from the aforementioned lack of consensus, the critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977b, 
1977a) postulates that the benefits of gender diversity outweigh the disadvantages of 
heterogeneous teams, if a certain threshold of female representation is reached. In her 
studies, Kanter (1977a, 1977b) created four groups (uniform, skewed, tilted and balanced), 
which differ concerning their gender composition. A uniform group is a homogeneous one 
with exclusively male or female members. The individuals of such a group, as well as the 
group as a whole, can develop their / its own uniqueness, although all members of a uniform 
group have a salient characteristic in common, such as gender or race. Skewed groups have 
a dominant proportion of one type of person, which takes control of the group and its culture. 
The few non-integrated group members are called ‘tokens’, for example, one women in a 
group of six men. Tilted groups display a less extreme group composition in terms of gender, 
compared to skewed ones. Hence, the ‘token woman’ status changes to a female minority 
group, which can impact on the group’s culture by creating alliances. As a minority, women 
are no longer seen as representatives of their social type, but as individuals. In balanced 
groups, the minority and majority turns into subgroups, in which gender loses importance. 
In real estate companies, women in leadership positions often find themselves in a skewed 
group, where a woman’s situation can be described as ‘tokenism’. Accordingly, a ‘token 
woman’ is not seen as an individual, but rather as representing the ‘women category’. Kanter 
                                                     
4 The statistical methods applied in the discussed studies are mean comparison test, anova, pooled OLS, panel data fixed-effects, 
2SLS, 3SLS and GMM. 
5 The most widely used performance measures are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), return 
on investment (ROI), earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), stock price growth, Tobin’s Q and market to book value. 
6 Gender diversity is measured in terms of binary variables for the presence of at least one woman in the boardroom, the 
percentage of women in the boardroom or specific diversity indices (e.g. Blau-Index). 
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(1977a, 1977b) stated three typical tendencies facing ‘tokens’: hypervisibility, polarisation and 
assimilation. In daily business, hypervisibility is associated with increased pressure on the 
female representative. Hence, each decision, reaction or failure receives increased and often 
excessive attention. Second, polarisation refers to the sense of community and self-
consciousness of the dominating part of the group, which increases by aligning 
commonalities and differences to the ‘token’. Finally, the tendencies of hypervisibility and 
polarisation may result in assimilation, which often involves ‘tokens’ being seen as mere 
stereotypes or representatives for their social type or rather their gender.  
Hypotheses 
In a male-dominated REIT sector, we assume that a sole woman on the board of directors 
does not have much influence on decision-making, since tokenism is likely to prevail. 
Considering REITs unique governance structure, an increased share of women might add an 
‘external monitoring perspective’ and thus be considered as a proxy for increased corporate 
social responsibility (Boulouta, 2013; Harjoto et al., 2015). Accordingly, firms which effectively 
exploit the advantages of heterogeneous teams may demonstrate improved performance. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that:  
H1: An increased percentage of women on the board of directors has a positive impact on 
financial performance. 
In addition to the board gender-composition analysis, we extend previous literature by 
explicitly distinguishing between executive and non-executive positions. In contrast to non-
executive directors, who are responsible for advisory tasks, executive directors operate the 
daily business and take crucial corporate decisions. Thus, they are highly visible and the 
subject of considerable media attention, leading to coverage by market analysts and 
attracting investor interest. Since gender diversity within executive positions is a strong signal 
of company commitment to diversity, it might be appreciated especially by socially responsible 
investors. 
H2: An increased share of women in executive positions has a stronger impact on financial 
performance than an increased share of women in non-executive positions.  
We extend hypotheses H1 and H2 by accounting for a possible non-linear relationship 
between gender diversity and financial performance. We assume that a critical mass of female 
representation is reached when the female status changes from ‘token woman’ to a female 
minority group. In this context, we also assume that a separate analysis of executive and non-
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executives positions leads to different impacts on financial performance. With regard to the 
critical mass of female representation, we hypothesise that: 
H3: Women’s contribution in leadership teams7 has a positive impact on financial 
performance, in particular when ‘tokenism’ no longer prevails (i.e. tilted or balanced teams).  
In a further step, we run an in-depth real estate analysis to examine which property sectors 
benefit particularly from gender diversity. The reason behind our expectation of different 
performance outcomes is twofold. First, unequal performance levels and variations can be 
observed for different property sectors. Therefore, we control for companies’ specific property 
focus within REITs. Second, companies which have a strong female client base, should also 
represent their clients’ needs in its leadership structure. Thus, female consumer-orientated 
companies that are matched in the sense of having management with the same traits (in this 
case gender), will perform better (Oystein Strom et al., 2014). In the analysis of different 
property sectors, we focus explicitly on company decision-makers, the group of executives, 
since they create and define the strategy. 
H4: For property sectors which are more consumer-orientated (health care, hotel, residential 
and retail), we expect a positive impact of female executives. 
We empirically examine the above mentioned hypotheses by simultaneously optimising the 
caveats of previous analyses, and assessing the financial impacts of gender diversity in a real 
estate context. This study applies panel data fixed-effects, includes an extensive set of board 
and firm control variables and accounts for the possibility of endogeneity. 
 
 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Sample Design 
We start the sample selection process, using the constituent list of the FTSE EPRA / NAREIT 
United States Index. The index’s admission criteria ensures a homogeneous sample with 
regard to the features of REITs (e.g. market capitalisation). In order to avoid survivorship bias, 
current and historical companies of the FTSE EPRA / NAREIT United States Index are included 
in the sample. Another requirement is that the companies have been publicly traded for more 
than five contiguous years during 2005-2015. The initial sample consists of 206 US listed real 
                                                     
7 In the context of critical mass theory, ‘teams’ refer to the board of directors, as well as the group of executives and non-
executives. 
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estate companies. The dataset was developed by combining various sources. Accounting and 
stock market data are collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream and SNL financial 
institution database. Data on corporate governance mechanisms is first extracted from the 
Bloomberg database and, secondly, from the company’s proxy statements (DEF 14A). The 
availability of corporate governance data restricts us to 2005 as the first year of our sample. 
After the selection process, our final sample includes 112 US Equity REITs, resulting in 1,232 
firm-year observations. 
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2.3.2 Measures 
Performance Variables 
As mentioned above, previous gender diversity studies mainly use ROA and Tobin’s Q as 
independent performance variables. However these measures are not reliable for REITs, which 
carry investment properties at historical cost, whereby ROA and Tobin’s Q do not reflect the 
market value of those assets. Considering the unique structure of REITs, we apply the real-
estate-specific performance measures funds from operations per share (FFO/SHARE) and price 
per net asset value (NAV). In accordance with NAREIT guidelines, the FFO is calculated as 
GAAP net income, excluding gains or losses from sales of properties or debt restructuring, 
and adding back real estate depreciation. PRICE/NAV represents the ratio of the market price 
to the book value of equity. For real estate companies, the NAV is quite similar to the book 
value of equity. Specifically, the PRICE/NAV is calculated by the market valuation divided by 
the NAV.  
 
Diversity Variables 
The likelihood that a company has a female director is measured by WOMAN BOARD. This 
binary variable equals 1, if at least one woman occupies a corporate board seat. In the 
performance regressions, gender diversity is measured by the percentage of female board 
directors (% WOMEN). Additionally, we determine the critical mass of gender diversity by 
introducing a quadratic term (% WOMEN SQ), and translate this critical percentage into 
different gender distributions within the board of directors. In accordance with critical mass 
theory (Kanter, 1977b, 1977a), we create the following four binary variables: 
 UNIFORM BOARD refers to a homogeneous male board. 
 SKEWED BOARD refers to a male-dominated board with less than 15% female 
directors. 
 TILTED BOARD refers to a less extreme domination of men in the board, with a female 
representation ranging from 15% to less than 30%. 
 BALANCED BOARD refers to heterogeneous board with more than 30% female 
directors. 
This categorisation approach is also applied to the group of executive and non-executive 
directors. 
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Board, Firm and Macro Control Variables 
We include various board and firm structure as well as macro variables in our models, so as 
to control for their influence on the presence of a woman on the board of directors, as well 
as on the performance metrics. With regard to board or governance characteristics of a 
company, CEO DUALITY represents an indicator variable for the power-sharing between CEO 
and chairman. % INDEPENDENT denotes the percentage of independent directors which do 
not have any business or employment relationship with the company8. INSIDERS represents 
the percentage of equities held by current officers and directors. INSTITUTIONALS is the 
percentage of shares held by all institutional investors. The variable BMEETING measures the 
total number of board meetings during a fiscal year, including all special meetings. CEO 
TENURE is the CEO’s time in office. QUALS WOMEN represents the average qualification level 
of female board members. BOARDSIZE is measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of 
directors on the board. We further subdivide the board of director positions into executive 
and non-executive positions. EXECUTIVES and NON-EXECUTIVES are measured by the natural 
logarithm of the sum of executive or non-executive directors, respectively. The variables 
BOARDSIZE, EXECUTIVES and NON-EXECUTIVES represent the ‘exclusion variable’ in the first 
stage probit models of the Heckman (1976) procedure. 
Concerning the firm structure variables, FIRMAGE is measured by the years for which a 
company has been listed on the stock exchange. The variable FIRMSIZE is a proxy for future 
growth opportunities, which is measured by the sum of total assets. We measure firm risk 
with two different variables. First, VOLATILITY, which is the standard deviation of the stock 
return, based on the weekly values divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40, and 
secondly LEVERAGE, which is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Finally, we control for 
liquidity using the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. 
Lastly, we include macro variables to control for general market movements. UNEMPLOYRATE 
is the average unemployment rate in the US. NTBI TR represents the total return of the NCREIF 
transaction-based index. TERMSTRUCTURE is the difference between 10-year and 3-month 
treasury yield, and thus represents the spread of long-term to short-term interest rates. 
  
                                                     
8 Our definition of an independent board member is in accordance with New York Stock Exchange’s independence requirements. 
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2.3.3 Model Specification  
With regard to the gender diversity / performance relationship, endogeneity problems can 
arise in different forms. Omitted unobservable variables could affect the selection of women 
in leadership positions, as well as corporate performance at the same time, which may lead 
to spurious correlations between gender diversity and firm financial performance. To address 
the problem of omitted variable bias, we apply fixed-effect panel estimation with period and 
firm dummies.9 This approach accounts for time-constant firm heterogeneity, caused by 
unobserved firm characteristics (e.g. corporate culture) and for time-varying heterogeneity 
caused by omitted variables which are constant over firms, but change over time (e.g. crisis 
or changes in government regulation).  
The association between female leadership and the performance metrics may be driven by 
reverse causality. On the one hand, it is possible that financially successful firms are more 
likely to hire female directors, since they attract a higher level of public attention, and 
therefore experience more pressure to conform to a certain level of female representation in 
boardrooms. On the other hand, since female representation in top management is scarce, 
women who are suitable for a senior management position may self-select into better 
performing firms (Dezsö & Ross, 2012). Finally, sample selection bias may arise if qualified 
women do not seek a board director position, even though being as eligible as the observed 
female directors. Following current gender literature (e.g. Hutchinson et al. 2015; Oystein 
Strom et al. 2014; Srinidhi et al. 2011), we control for sample selection bias by applying a 
two-stage Heckman (1976) procedure. In a first step of this procedure, we apply probit 
estimation to predict the factors associated with female leadership. We then compute the 
inverse Mill’s ratio (MILLS) from the predicted values for the likelihood that a company has a 
female director. In a second step, MILLS is included in the performance regressions, in order 
to control for the performance between companies with and without female directors.  
  
                                                     
9 We apply the Hausmann test to determine the existence of a correlation between the unobserved effects and the explanatory 
variables. Since the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the observed variables, the fixed-effects method is applied. 
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First-stage probit model  
We run the following probit regression to predict the presence of females on the board of 
directors: 
Pr 
, = 1 = Φ  +   
 , +  , +  ,  !   (1) 
In the above equation, " denotes the probit function, i the firm, t the year (2005–2015) and 
ɛ the error term. Controls refers to a variety of board and firm structure as well as macro 
variables as described in Section ‘Measures’. The two-stage Heckman (1976) procedure is 
especially robust in cases where the variables in the first and second stage equations are not 
the same. Therefore, we need to include a variable in the first stage, which has an impact on 
the likelihood of a company having a female director (first stage), but no impact on the 
financial performance of a company (second stage). Since the probability of a woman 
occupying a corporate board seat is higher for larger boards, we use the board size as an 
‘exclusion variable’. We do not expect the size of the board to directly affect the dependent 
performance variables in the second stage. The included board and firm controls in the first 
stage are identical to those in the performance regressions in the second stage.  
 
Second-stage fixed effects model  
The proposed hypotheses are tested by estimating the following fixed-effects regression 
model: 
#$, =   +  % &', +   , + , +  ( +  ) +  ,      (2) 
In this model, i denotes the firm, and t the year (2005-2015). Mills represents the inverse Mills 
ratio, which is estimated from the first stage probit model so as to account for sample 
selection bias.  ( refers to firm fixed-effects and ) to time fixed-effects for the years 2005 to 
2015 and ɛ represents the error term. Performance refers, on the one hand, to the market-
based performance measures Tobin’s Q and Price per NAV and, on the other hand, to the 
accounting-based performance measures ROA and FFO per share. Gender diversity denotes 
either the percentage of women on board or Kanter’s critical mass board groups. Controls 
represents a broad set of board characteristics (e.g. INSIDERS, CEO DUALITY), firm 
characteristics (e.g. LEVERAGE, FIRMSIZE) and macroeconomic factors (e.g. UNEMPLOYRATE, 
TERMSTRUCTURE) with a potential impact on financial performance. 
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The fixed-effects specification (2) is estimated with robust standard errors, which are valid in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of arbitrary forms for panels with a 
small T and a large N (Arellano, 1987). Furthermore, a diagnostic test for multicollinearity is 
performed. All explanatory variables have variance inflation factors (VIF) below 10, suggesting 
that multicollinearity is not a problem in this regression analysis. 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 provides an overview of descriptive statistics for the whole sample. The variables 
are sorted by ‘performance variables’, ‘female participation variables’, ‘board and firm control 
variables’, ‘macro variables’ and provide the key statistics: number of observations, median, 
mean, standard deviation, maxima and minima. 
On average, REITs yield an average Price/NAV ratio of 0.5 and a FFO per share ratio of 2.4. 
Approximately 58% of the firms have at least one woman on the board of directors. On 
average, a US REIT has 9% female representation on the board of directors. These female 
directors possess an average of two qualifications, within a range of 0-5 qualifications (e.g. 
high school diploma, Bachelor’s / Master’s degree, RICS title etc.). The average board 
comprises 8 directors, thereof 76% independent directors. The boards meet on average about 
seven times per year. More than half of the US listed real estate companies have separate 
CEO and board chair positions. The CEO’s average time in office is 8 years. About 7.3% of 
the shares are owned by insiders and about three quarters by institutional shareholders. Most 
of the companies have been listed for about 14.7 years on the stock exchange. The average 
total assets of a US REIT amount to $ 4.650 billion. The average company’s gearing is about 
50%, liquidity about 20% and stock price volatility 5%. Concerning our macroeconomic 
control factors, the 11-year average unemployment rate is 6.8%, the NCREIF transaction-
based index yields an average total return of 2.2%. On average, the spread between long- 
and short-term interest rates (term structure) from 2005-2015 has been positive at 1.9%. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
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With regard to the correlation matrix, Table 2.2 presents the correlation coefficients of the 
independent variables in the second stage performance regressions. By examining the 
correlations among these variables, we run a first test of multicollinearity. A widely used 
threshold, indicating multicollinearity issues, is reached at a correlation coefficient of 0.8 
(absolute value) or above. The highest correlation coefficient of 0.613 is reported between 
the binary variable WOMAN BOARD and the percentage of women on the board (% WOMAN 
BOARD). This does not pose any problem, since these two variables are never simultaneously 
in the same regression.10 Further correlations vary from -0.349 between a company’s liquidity 
and the PRICE/NAV, to a correlation coefficient of 0.563 between a company’s liquidity and 
price volatility.  
Firms which have at least one woman on the board of directors are larger, have more board 
members and a longer company history. However, these positive relations are difficult to 
interpret in one direction, as larger (correlation coefficient of 0.487) and older firms 
(correlation coefficient of 0.271) have larger boards. Thus, it is possible that the probability 
of a female board member simply be driven by the board size. In addition, companies with a 
higher rate of independent board members are more likely to have a woman on the board. 
The CEO power measured by CEO DUALITY is also related to the presence of a female director. 
Thus, firms with CEO’s who are simultaneously the chair of the board, are more likely to have 
a female board member. Finally, the volatility of the share price is lower if the firm has at least 
one woman on the board. 
  
                                                     
10 WOMAN BOARD is the dependent variable in the first stage probit model and % WOMEN BOARD is the independent variable 
of particular interest in the second stage performance regression. 
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Table 2.2: Correlation Matrix 
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Table 2.3 shows the results of the mean-comparison tests between firms with and without 
female directors. We test whether the mean of various characteristics differs between these 
two groups. Most of the tested variables display significant mean differences, which are 
consistent with the pattern found in the correlation table. Larger and older firms tend to have 
women on the board. Firms with a larger board are more likely to have female directors. On 
the one hand, the ownership structure shows that firms with a higher percentage of insider 
shareholders are less likely to have a woman on the board. On the other hand, a higher 
percentage of institutional investors increases the probability of female representation on the 
board. An initial indication of a significant relationship between female directors and market 
performance is provided by a significant mean difference for PRICE/NAV. The mean value of 
this performance measure is higher for firms with women on the board of directors. 
Concerning our macro variables, a normal term structure with long-term interest rates that 
exceed short-term ones, seems to positively affect the presence of female directors on boards. 
Hence, a stable macroeconomic environment contributes to an increased appointment of 
female directors. 
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Table 2.3: Mean-Comparison of Firms with and without Female Directors 
 
  
Variable 
Mean for  
WOMAN BOARD =1 
(n= 473) 
Mean for  
WOMAN BOARD =0 
(n= 642) 
Difference t-stats 
BOARDSIZE 8.811 7.746 -1.07*** -9.21 
% INDEPENDENT 0.779 0.731 -5.06 -0.05 
CEO DUALITY 0.438 0.516 0.08*** 2.59 
INSIDERS 0.060 0.092 0.03*** 5.42 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.796 0.736 -0.06*** -4.61 
BMEETING 7.914 7.642 -0.27 -1.20 
CEO TENURE 7.372 9.303 1.93*** 5.07 
FIRMSIZE (in $000) 5,848,270 3,018,773 -2,829,497*** -8.87 
LEVERAGE 0.507 0.500 -0.01 -0.67 
VOLATILITY 4.935 5.354 0.42** 2.18 
LIQUIDITY 0.183 0.175 -0.01 -1.28 
FIRMAGE 17.590 13.490 -4.1*** -6.70 
QUALS WOMEN 2.116 2.309 0.19 1.39 
UNEMPLOYRATE 6.894 6.869 -0.02 -0.22 
NTBI TR 0.021 0.022 0 0.41 
TERMSTRUCTURE 2.004 1.879 -0.12** -2.02 
PRICE NAV 0.536 0.465 -0.07*** -5.28 
FFO/SHARE 2.385 2.454 0.07 0.44 
Table 2.3 shows the mean differences of firms with a woman on the board (WOMAN BOARD = 1) or not (WOMAN BOARD = 0). BOARDSIZE 
represents the natural logarithm of the sum of directors on the board. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the 
company's board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS 
represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of shares 
held by all institutional investors. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the number of all board meetings during a fiscal year. CEO 
TENURE is the CEO’s time in office. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. 
LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is 
measured by the years since listing on the stock exchange. QUALS WOMEN represents the average qualification level of female board members. 
UNEMPLOYRATE is the average unemployment rate in the US. NTBI TR represents the total return of the NCREIF transaction-based index. 
TERMSTRUCTURE is the difference between 10yr and 3month treasury yield. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation 
divided by the NAV. FFO/SHARE is the natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. 
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2.4.2 Main Regression Results 
Impact of women on the board of directors 
Table 2.4 shows the first stage regression results for the likelihood that a firm has a woman 
on the board of directors. We follow the gender literature in determining the board and firm 
variables that may impact on the likelihood that a company has a female director (Campbell 
& Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2003; Dimovski et al., 2013; Hillman et al., 2007). With 
regard to the size of the board, more leadership positions being available may increase the 
likelihood of females occupying those positions (BOARDSIZE). Moreover, larger companies 
may face more societal pressure to increase their boardroom diversity, so that we control for 
organisational size (FIRMSIZE). Furthermore, women are often associated with risk aversion 
(Faccio et al., 2016). If women are indeed more risk averse, they would be less likely to occupy 
a board seat of a high-risk firm. Therefore, we include LEVERAGE and VOLATILITY as proxies 
for firm risk. We also control for the liquidity of a company (LIQUIDITY), and include firm age 
(FIRMAGE) in our models. Older firms may have more conservative structures with 
boardrooms that might resemble an ‘old boys network’. Assuming that firms with deep-
rooted conservative structures are not inclined to appoint female directors, we expect a 
negative relationship between FIRMAGE and WOMAN BOARD. Based on the premise that 
women do not yet belong to this ‘old boys network’, they conform more to independent 
director characteristics. Therefore, we expect an increased female representation in firms with 
a high percentage of independent directors (% INDEPENDENT). Since institutional 
shareholders increasingly emphasise diversity, we expect INSTITUTIONALS to have a positive 
impact on female board appointments. Additionally, board diversity can be influenced by 
powerful insider ownership concentration (INSIDERS). Since most of the insider shareholders 
are men, a high percentage of insider equity owner may lead to a decreased number of female 
directors. Once again, we assume that company insiders are more likely to appoint boardroom 
candidates from within their ‘old boys network’. The impact of CEO DUALITY on the variable 
WOMAN BOARD is not clearly determined in advance. On the one hand, the availability of 
leading board positions increases the probability of a female board appointment. On the other 
hand, a CEO who also holds the board chair position, has a substantial say in the appointment 
of directors (Ozdemir & Upneja, 2012), and may therefore enforce an increased female 
participation. We included PRICE/NAV as a market-based performance metric, since it may be 
that performance precedes diversity. If women themselves choose to serve on the boards of 
companies with higher future cash flows, PRICE/NAV should have a positive impact on the 
presence of female directors. 
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In most cases, our coefficients show the expected sign. Thus, larger real estate companies 
with a larger board and a higher share of independent directors are more likely to employ 
female directors. Our results also show that REIT institutional investors do support gender-
diverse leadership teams. Due to REIT ownership restriction, institutional investors may expect 
women to contribute to an enhanced internal monitoring and thus do support gender-diverse 
leadership teams. The coefficient of CEO DUALITY is positive and statistically significant. If the 
CEO is simultaneously the board chair, he/she has a strong say in personal matters, which 
increases the probability of having female board members. The qualification of female 
directors neither enhances nor decreases their probability of being appointed to the board. 
With regard to the performance of the company, PRICE/NAV has no significant impact on 
female participation11. We cannot support the theory of women being more risk averse, since 
LEVERAGE and VOLATILITY have no impact on the presence of women on boards. 
Summarising the determinants of female representation on the board, firm-level 
characteristics do not seem to drive female board participation, except for size and age of the 
company, although board-level characteristics do. 
 
                                                     
11 We also tested the performance effects of FFO/SHARE on the likelihood that a REIT has a woman on the board of directors. 
Similarly to PRICE/NAV, FFO/SHARE has no impact on female participation. 
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Table 2.4: Heckman Procedure: 1st-Stage Analysis for the Determinants of Female 
Representation 
 
  
 
WOMAN BOARD 
BOARDSIZE 0.841* (1.79) 
% INDEPENDENT 2.38*** (3.01) 
CEO DUALITY 0.508*** (3.21) 
INSIDERS -0.196 (-0.23) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.850* (1.86) 
FIRMSIZE 0.367*** (3.63) 
LEVERAGE 0.158 (0.33) 
VOLATILITY -0.056 (-1.54) 
LIQUIDITY -1.112 (-1.23) 
PRICE NAV -0.118 (-0.31) 
QUALS WOMEN -0.058 (-0.78) 
INTERCEPT -8.114*** (-5.35) 
Observations 562 
Pseudo R² 0.16 
LR 69.58*** 
Table 2.4 provides the results of the first stage Heckman procedure (pooled probit regression) for the likelihood of a company 
having a woman on the board of directors. WOMAN BOARD is a binary variable equal to 1 if at least one female director 
occupies a corporate board seat, 0 otherwise. BOARDSIZE represents the natural logarithm of the sum of directors on the 
board. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the company's board. CEO DUALITY is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage of 
outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of shares held by all 
institutional investors. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and 
multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm 
of the market valuation divided by the NAV. QUALS WOMEN represents the average qualification level of female board 
members.***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. z-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 2.5 presents the estimation results for the second-stage regressions with the real-estate-
specific performance measures (PRICE/NAV, FFO/SHARE) as the dependent variables. With 
regard to our main hypothesis H1, we include the percentage of women on the board of 
directors (%WOMEN BOARD) as our independent variable of primary interest. We control for 
potential endogeneity by including the inverse mills ratio (MILLS), which is not significant in 
any model. In principle, the regressions do not suffer from sample selection bias.  
 
Table 2.5: Heckman Procedure: 2nd-Stage Analysis for Women on the Board of 
Directors 
  PRICE/NAV FFO/SHARE 
% WOMEN BOARD 0.038 (0.28) 0.070 (0.12) 
FIRMSIZE 0.093* (1.67) 0.858*** (5.75) 
LEVERAGE -0.406*** (-3.22) 0.688* (1.76) 
VOLATILITY -0.012*** (-3.06) -0.038* (-1.96) 
LIQUIDITY -0.368*** (-3.14) -0.321 (-0.59) 
FIRMAGE -0.088** (-2.01) 0.031 (0.19) 
FFO -0.050 (-1.03)  
PRICE/NAV  0.202 (0.49) 
% INDEPENDENT 0.013 (0.56) -0.009 (-0.08) 
CEO DUALITY 0.064** (2.19) 0.013 (0.11) 
INSIDERS 0.256** (2.24) 0.664 (1.20) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.015 (0.16) -0.691** (-2.22) 
BMEETING 0.013 (0.57) -0.170 (-1.32) 
CEO TENURE 0.000 (0.08) 0.017 (1.55) 
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.005 (0.66) 0.575*** (3.51) 
NTBI TR -0.079 (-0.40) -0.081 (-0.06) 
TERMSTRUCTURE -0.012 (-1.09) -0.275 (0.10) 
MILLS 0.010 (0.09) -0.092 (-0.29) 
INTERCEPT 0.200 (0.35) -13.498*** (-5.11) 
Observations 524 735 
R² 0.80 0.86 
Adj. R² 0.75 0.83 
Table 2.5 shows the results of the second stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-section fixed 
effects). The dependent performance measures are represented by market-based (PRICE/NAV) and accounting-based 
measures (FFO/SHARE). PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation divided by the NAV. FFO/SHARE is the 
natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
% WOMEN BOARD represents the percentage of women in the board of directors. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on 
the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares 
outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is measured by the years since listing on the 
stock exchange. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the company's board. CEO DUALITY is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage 
of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of shares held by all 
institutional investors. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the number of all board meetings during a fiscal year. 
CEO TENURE is the CEO’s time in office. UNEMPLOYRATE is the average unemployment rate in the US. NTBI TR represents 
the total return of the NCREIF transaction-based index. TERMSTRUCTURE is the difference between 10yr and 3month treasury 
yield. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated from the probit model to account for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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We do not find any significant and positive association between female board representation 
and REIT performance. Therefore, we have to reject our first hypothesis H1, that an increased 
percentage of women on the board of directors has a positive impact on a REIT’s financial 
performance. Consequently, women on the board of directors neither enhance nor reduce 
market-level performance (PRICE/NAV), and the same applies to operating performance 
(FFO/SHARE). 
However, if we distinguish explicitly between the female proportions in executive and in non-
executive positions (Table 2.6), our results show that female executives (% WOMEN EXE) have 
a significant positive impact on PRICE/NAV (at 5% level). We could not find any significant 
results for the percentage of female non-executive directors (% WOMEN NON-EXE) on 
financial performance. Since executives bear the responsibility for strategic corporate 
decisions and day-to-day business, they are highly visible and thus subject to considerable 
media attention, leading to coverage by market analysts and attracting investor interest. 
Consequently, the theory that REIT investors expect higher future earnings through increased 
corporate social responsibility from firm’s with increased female representation, only holds 
for gender diversity in executive positions. Furthermore, in comparison to women in less 
visible leadership positions, female executive directors especially qualify as role models. In 
such a role model function, successful female executives may encourage female employees 
to strive for higher career levels, therefore increasing the pool of female talents and board 
candidates (Hillman et al., 2007). With regard to our accounting-based measure FFO/SHARE, 
board gender diversity, particularly women in non-executive positions, does not influence 
operating performance, because other financial factors, such as a company’s total assets or 
capital structure, are more suitable for explaining these financial realities. 
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Table 2.6: Heckman Procedure: 2nd-Stage Analysis for Women in Executive and Non-
executive Positions 
 
 
  
  Executives Non-Executives 
  PRICE/NAV FFO/SHARE PRICE/NAV FFO/SHARE 
% WOMEN EXE 0.185** (2.22) 1.001 (1.59)   
% WOMEN NONEXE   -0.074 (-0.73) -0.218 (-0.30) 
FIRMSIZE 0.068* (1.94) 0.999*** (4.94) 0.051 (1.37) 1.286*** (4.96) 
LEVERAGE -0.412*** (-4.12) 1.007* (1.76) -0.402*** (-3.57) 1.670** (2.02) 
VOLATILITY -0.011*** (-4.30) -0.097 (-1.29) -0.011*** (-4.19) -0.091 (-1.27) 
LIQUIDITY -0.290*** (-3.30) -2.001 (-1.53) -0.280*** (-2.66) -2.465* (-1.70) 
FIRMAGE -0.040 (-1.20) -0.309 (-1.23) -0.039 (-1.13) -0.282 (-1.13) 
FFO -0.033 (-1.49)  -0.023 (-1.07)  
PRICE/NAV  -0.339 (-0.45)  0.277 (0.40) 
% INDEPENDENT -0.005 (-0.17) -0.149 (-0.74) -0.010 (-0.22) 0.219 (1.24) 
CEO DUALITY 0.000 (-0.02) 0.106 (0.58) 0.007 (0.20) -0.283 (-0.84) 
INSIDERS 0.231* (1.94) 0.379 (0.40) 0.201 (1.32) -1.397 (-1.05) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.118** (1.97) -0.552 (-1.19) 0.115* (1.85) -0.617 (-1.24) 
BMEETING 0.019 (0.99) 0.026 (0.08) 0.018 (0.90) 0.024 (0.07) 
CEO TENURE 0.000 (0.04) 0.015 (0.92) 0.000 (0.10) 0.016 (0.95) 
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.009* (1.78) 0.210*** (4.47) 0.011 (1.61) 0.174*** (3.20) 
NTBI TR -0.073 (-0.58) 0.683 (0.45) -0.122 (-0.87) -0.195 (-0.12) 
TERMSTRUCTURE -0.016** (-2.37) -0.130*** (-2.68) -0.019** (-2.33) -0.116* (-1.88) 
MILLS -0.017 (-0.52) 0.066 (0.13) -0.018 (-0.20) 1.181 (1.61) 
INTERCEPT 0.144 (0.39) -12.125*** (-4.17) 0.274 (0.49) -17.562*** (-4.34) 
Observations 928 909 928 909 
R² 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.86 
Adj. R² 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.84 
Table 2.6 shows the results of the second-stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-section fixed effects) for 
women in the group of executives and non-executives. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation divided by the 
NAV. FFO/SHARE is the natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. % WOMEN EXE and % WOMEN NON-EXE represents the percentage of women in the group of executives and 
non-executives, respectively. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 
40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, 
whereby age is measured by the years since listing on the stock exchange. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent 
directors on the company's board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 
0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). 
INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of shares held by all institutional investors. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the 
number of all board meetings during a fiscal year. CEO TENURE is the CEO’s time in office. UNEMPLOYRATE is the average 
unemployment rate in the US. NTBI TR represents the total return of the NCREIF transaction-based index. TERMSTRUCTURE is 
the difference between 10yr and 3month treasury yield. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated from the probit model to account 
for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. 
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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2.4.3 Alternative Tests 
Impact of different gender compositions in the group of executives  
With regard to the ‘tokenism theory’ of Kanter (1977a, 1977b), it may be that the gender 
diversity / performance relationship is non-linear. Therefore, we rerun the Heckman 2-step 
procedure by including gender diversity in its quadratic term (% WOMEN EXE SQ).  
 
Table 2.7: Heckman Procedure: 2nd-Stage Analysis with % WOMEN EXE in its Linear 
and Quadratic Form 
 
  
  PRICE/NAV 
% WOMEN EXE -0.243** (-2.02) 
% WOMEN EXE SQ 0.885*** (4.09) 
FIRMSIZE 0.042 (1.53) 
LEVERAGE -0.277*** (-3.47) 
VOLATILITY -0.007*** (-2.70) 
LIQUIDITY -0.253*** (-2.82) 
FIRMAGE -0.040* (-1.96) 
FFO -0.032 (-1.44) 
% INDEPENDENT 0.000 (-0.02) 
CEO DUALITY -0.002 (-0.15) 
INSIDERS 0.189* (1.82) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.102** (2.16) 
BMEETING 0.008 (0.64) 
CEO TENURE 0.001 (0.47) 
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.067*** (3.75) 
NTBI TR -0.571*** (-4.30) 
TERMSTRUCTURE -0.064*** (-5.75) 
MILLS -0.054** (-1.99) 
INTERCEPT 0.205 (0.65) 
Observations 755 
R² 0.70 
Adj. R² 0.63 
Table 2.7 shows the results of the second-stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-section fixed 
effects) for women in the group of executives and the squared percentage of women in the group of executives. PRICE/NAV 
is the natural logarithm of the market valuation divided by the NAV. % WOMEN EXE and % WOMEN EXE SQ represents 
the percentage of women in the group of executives and the squared percentage of women, respectively. FIRMSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation 
of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the 
ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is measured by 
the years since listing on the stock exchange. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the company's 
board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. 
INSIDERS represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). INSTITUTIONALS 
is the percentage of shares held by all institutional investors. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the number of all 
board meetings during a fiscal year. CEO TENURE is the CEO’s time in office. UNEMPLOYRATE is the average 
unemployment rate in the US. NTBI TR represents the total return of the NCREIF transaction-based index. 
TERMSTRUCTURE is the difference between 10yr and 3month treasury yield. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated 
from the probit model to account for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-
value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
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The results (Table 2.7) confirm Kanter’s tokenism theory, since a low level of female 
representation has a negative effect on PRICE/NAV. However, once a certain threshold of 
female representation has been reached, the impact becomes positive, as the coefficient of 
% WOMEN EXE SQ on PRICE/NAV is significantly positive (1%-Level). Figure 2.1 plots the 
relationship between gender diversity in executive positions, according to the regression line 
resulting from the estimation, which includes the quadratic term. The graph displays a U-
shaped link with increasing PRICE/NAV levels for REITs at approximately 30% female 
representation. 
 
Figure 2.1: Link between PRICE/NAV and Gender Diversity in the Group of Executives 
 
 
In order to determine the outperformance for different gender compositions within the group 
of executives, we apply the numbers from our quadratic term estimation and categorise 
according to Kanter’s approach, into uniform (0% women), skewed (0% < x < 15% women), 
tilted (15% ≤ x < 30% women) and balanced (x ≥ 30% women) groups. We rerun both stages 
of the Heckman (1976) procedure, including these four groups that vary in their gender 
composition, as well as the usual set of board, firm and macroeconomic controls and the 
inverse Mill’s ratio.  
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The results of the ‘tokenism’ analysis are displayed in Table 2.8, with uniform groups 
representing the reference category. We find that firms with a balanced executive team 
outperform homogeneous male groups by 5.7%, as measured by PRICE/NAV (at 10% level). 
The coefficients for the two other executive groups (SKEWED and TILTED) are not statistically 
different from zero. We verify H3 that a female ‘token’ has no impact on the market 
performance. Even a female minority group does not contribute to higher market 
performance. Hence, a certain level of female representation is needed to generate an impact. 
In the case of REITs, a critical mass of female executives is reached in balanced groups (> 30% 
women)12.  
 
Table 2.8: Heckman Procedure: 2nd-Stage Analysis for the 'Tokenism' Analysis 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
12 The U-shaped relation only holds for gender diversity in the group of executives and for the market-based measure PRICE/NAV. 
The gender distribution within the group of non-executives does not show any significant effect, and neither does the 
operating performance measure FFO/SHARE. 
  Executives   
 PRICE/NAV FFO/SHARE  
SKEWED -0.008(-0.31) 0.382(1.57)   
TILTED 0.013(0.46) 0.215(1.24)  
BALANCED 0.057*(1.73) 0.291(1.22)  
Observations 928 909   
Controls included included  
MILLS included included  
R² 0.76 0.77  
Adj. R² 0.72 0.73   
Table 2.8 shows the results of the second-stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-
section fixed effects) with a focus on different gender compositions in the group of executives and non-
executives. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation divided by the NAV. FFO/SHARE is 
the natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. UNIFORM is a binary variable equal to 1 for homogeneous male groups, 0 otherwise and represents 
the reference category in all regressions. SKEWED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of women 
varies from 1% to less than 15%, 0 otherwise. TILTED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of women 
varies from 15% to less than 30%, 0 otherwise. BALANCED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of 
women is at least 30%, 0 otherwise. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated from the probit model to account 
for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-
value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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Impact of different gender compositions in real estate property sectors 
Table 2.9 provides an in-depth analysis of real estate companies’ different property sectors. 
Panel A shows the results of the mean-comparison test for the average percentage of female 
executives, classified by different property sectors. In our sample, women occupy on average 
9.0% of executive positions. With 13.5% and 14.2% of women in the group of executives, 
the property sectors health care and residential, respectively, show a significantly higher 
female representation than the sample’s average percentage of women in the group of 
executives. The sectors office, hotel and industrial account for the smallest mean percentage 
of female executives in comparison with the overall sample average. 
Panel B displays the regression results for the performance effects of female executives in 
different property sectors. The group of executives is subdivided by its gender composition 
into uniform, skewed, tilted and balanced groups, whereas uniform represents the reference 
category. As hypothesised in H4, it is important for profitable companies to consider customer 
needs through the management team. In the regressions of the health care and retail 
subsample, the coefficients for the balanced group of executives show the expected positive 
signs. A balanced executive team outperforms a homogeneous male group by 12.1% (health 
care) and 6.1% (retail), as measured by PRICE/NAV. This positive association stresses the 
importance of a diverse leadership team for real estate sectors which are more consumer-
orientated. Furthermore, these findings are also of particular interest for real estate sectors 
with a diverse workforce, e.g. the health care sector, where women account for the majority 
of employees. Interestingly, companies with a residential and hotel property focus do not 
seem to benefit particularly from gender-diverse management. This might be explained by 
the fact that the consumer base for housing and lodging is relatively equally distributed 
between women and men. Interestingly, the subsample industrial shows a positive 
performance effect for skewed and balanced executive teams. With only 92 observations in 
the industrial subsample, extreme values may bias the results. In conclusion, female leadership 
connects the firm to its customers and employees, which is then rewarded by investors. 
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Table 2.9: Different Property Sectors Analysis 
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2.5 Conclusion  
This study extends the REIT corporate governance literature by demonstrating that investors 
pay increased attention to gender diversity in their investment decisions. We offer new 
insights into the relationship between gender diversity in boardrooms and firm financial 
performance by focusing on the REIT sector.  
Using a sample of 112 US Equity REITs from 2005 till 2015, this study is the first to examine 
the development and status quo of women in real estate leadership roles, and their 
contribution to performance. Whereas in 2005, the percentage of women on the board of 
directors accounted for 7.6%, in 2015, female representation in the board reached 11.7%. 
The real estate sector, although traditionally male-dominated, has shown a gradual increase 
in the inclusion of women on boards over the last few years.  
We test several hypotheses to determine whether real estate companies benefit from a 
diversified board of directors. To control for endogeneity within this relationship, we first need 
to investigate the factors that impact on a real estate company’s female representation. We 
find that larger firms with larger boards have a higher female representation on the board of 
directors. This finding indicates that more leadership positions being available - usually the 
case in larger REITs, since leadership complexity is higher - increases the likelihood of females 
occupying those positions. Our results also show that institutional investors and independent 
board members have a positive impact on female board appointments. In the REIT context, 
where extensive external monitoring through large blockholders is weaker than in other 
industry sectors, independent shareholders and institutional investors may expect women to 
contribute to an enhanced internal monitoring, and thus do support gender-diverse 
leadership teams. 
With regard to our performance analysis, we find that women on the board of directors 
neither enhance nor reduce market-level performance (PRICE/NAV) as well as operating 
performance (FFO/SHARE). However, distinguishing explicitly between the female proportions 
in executive and in non-executive positions, our results show that female executives (% 
WOMEN EXE) have a significant positive impact on PRICE/NAV. Since executive directors, in 
comparison to non-executive directors, are the subject of considerable media attention and 
coverage by analysts, investors expect higher future earnings from REITs with increased 
female representation in executive positions.  
We find evidence of a U-shaped relationship between gender diversity in executive positions 
and PRICE/NAV. Accordingly, a certain level of female representation is needed to generate 
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an impact. In the case of REITs, a critical mass of female executives is reached at approximately 
30% female representation. Specifically, firms with a balanced executive team outperform 
homogeneous male groups by 5.7%, as measured by PRICE/NAV. This finding holds especially 
for real estate sectors with a strong consumer orientation and a high proportion of women 
in the workforce, such as retail and health care. 
The results also demonstrate that the gender diversity / performance relationship depends on 
the measure of performance. More specifically, the hypothesis proposed above, that women 
have a positive impact on financial performance, is not supported by the accounting-based 
performance measure FFO/SHARE. Other financial factors, such as a company’s total assets 
or capital structure, are more suitable for explaining these financial realities. Concerning the 
impact of gender-diverse teams on PRICE/NAV, our findings indicate that REIT investors 
consider a critical mass of female representation in executive positions as a positive 
investment variable, thereby increasing the demand for those companies’ shares and 
ultimately their prices. Thus, the REIT specific market-based measure PRICE/NAV is probably 
the more appropriate performance measure in the context of gender diversity, since the 
positive influence of female directors does relate to investor perceptions, however it does not 
to operating performance.  
Future research could extend the diversity analysis to women participation at the middle 
management level. It would be interesting to examine how women in middle management 
positions affect financial performance. It would also be interesting to analyse the relationship 
between performance, a REIT’s corporate social responsibility ranking (e.g. KLD scores) and 
female representation. Such an investigation would shed further light on the 
interdependences between these mechanisms. Moreover, the real estate corporate 
governance literature would also benefit from an investigation of further diversity dimensions, 
such as race, religion, age and education. 
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3 The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US REITs: 
Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper examines whether executive compensation packages within the real estate industry 
are determined merely by performance or also by CEO power mechanisms that have an 
essential influence on board-level negotiations. We offer original into management 
compensation arrangements during and after the financial crisis. The relative importance of 
cash bonuses within CEO compensation contracts has been more than halved after the crisis. 
Simultaneously, after the financial crisis, equity-based compensation became increasingly 
important. Concerning the pay-for-performance link our results show no relationship during 
the financial crisis. However, after the crisis, we show a strong significant link between 
remuneration packages and corporate success. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 revealed that managers had been rewarded for excessive 
short-term risk-taking (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Spamann, 2010; Cheng, Hong, & Scheinkman, 
2015; Clementi, Cooley, Richardson, & Walter, 2009). The devastating consequences of the 
financial crisis have triggered a heated debate on executive compensation, and especially on 
the effectiveness of performance-based compensation. In 2011, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to its disclosure rules. The ‘Say-on-Pay’13 rule now 
provides shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation. Hence, through 
regulation, the SEC is attempting to strengthen shareholder engagement in listed companies, 
provide a framework for effective pay-for-performance arrangements and finally, increase 
transparency. However, the practical implementation of pay-for-performance arrangements 
after the financial crisis has so far not been assessed systematically. This paper aims to fill this 
void by empirically examining C-level compensation packages in the US real estate industry.  
Previous research on compensation has built upon the arguments of agency theory (Bloom & 
Milkovich, 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and/or managerial power theory (Bebchuk et al., 
2002). Agency theory proclaims that CEO/executive compensation is primarily determined by 
company performance. Managerial power theory, however, considers the significant 
influence of CEOs on board member’s decisions, and ultimately on the level of their own 
compensation and pay sensitivity to performance. Moreover, recent studies like Murphy 
(2013) show that government intervention and political climate have been major drivers of 
time trends in executive compensation over the last years. The question then is which of these 
theories apply to real estate companies and whether political shocks like the financial crises 
or government intervention (Say-on-Pay reform) trigger substantial changes in executive pay. 
A large number of studies have examined the pay-for-performance relationship empirically in 
the context of REITs. The literature, however, provides ambiguous findings, with evidence 
that agency theory and managerial power theory both play a valuable role in explaining 
distinct compensation patterns within the real estate industry. For example, Ghosh and 
Sirmans (2005) find that independent directors - a determinant in monitoring CEO power - 
are associated with higher remuneration packages, whereas Feng et al. (2010) find an 
insignificant relationship between independent directors and compensation, while other 
studies do not even control for this monitoring variable (e.g., Pennathur et al., 2005; Griffith 
et al., 2011). Hence, a thorough assessment of the compensation determinants within the 
real estate industry is needed, taking into consideration the explanatory validity of agency 
                                                     
13 For further information on the ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule see: https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178-secg.htm. 
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theory, managerial power theory and government intervention in the context of 
compensation levels and its sensitivity to firm performance. We extend the current literature 
by investigating the pay-performance relationship with respect to the entire group of 
executive directors, alongside a detailed analysis of CEO compensation.  
To analyse the pay-performance relationship from different time-horizon perspectives, we 
distinguish between short-term total current cash compensation (TCC: base salary and cash 
bonus), long-term compensation (TDC: base salary, cash bonus, restricted stock grants, stock 
options granted, long-term incentive pay-outs (LTIP) and all other total) and incentive-based 
compensation (EQUITY: value of stocks and options granted). Company performance is 
measured using five different variables: the average shareholder total return over one, three 
and five years (TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR) and the real estate specific measures FFO/SHARE and 
PRICE/NAV. Using a panel data fixed-effects methodology and lagged performance variables 
we find: (1) Short-term cash compensation of CEOs and executive directors is primarily driven 
by the performance ratio of total return to shareholders over one year. (2) Long-term 
compensation packages for CEOs and executive directors are tied to long-term performance, 
as the total return to shareholders over five years as well as the real estate specific metrics 
FFO/SHARE and PRICE/NAV have a significant positive impact on TDC. (3) Incentive-based 
compensation is positively linked to long-term and value-driven growth performance ratios 
(TSR5YR and PRICE/NAV). 
Additionally, we offer original into management compensation arrangements during and 
after the financial crisis. The relative importance of cash bonuses within CEO compensation 
contracts has been more than halved after the crisis. Simultaneously, after the financial crisis, 
equity-based compensation became increasingly important. Rerunning our regressions for 
different time sub-samples, we find no relationship between performance and compensation 
during the financial crisis. However, for the post-crisis period, we show a strong significant 
link between remuneration packages and corporate success. 
Our findings are relevant to REIT investors, since we provide evidence that the U.S. listed real 
estate sector has learned its lessons from the dramatic disaster of the financial crisis and that 
government intervention like the ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule can alleviate managerial entrenchment.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two reviews the theoretical 
reasoning and relevant literature on this topic, followed by the methodology of the panel 
data analysis in the third Section. The data are described in Section four. The results are 
displayed in Section five and the conclusion in Section six. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Theoretical Background 
Agency problems arise due to the separation of company ownership (stockholders) and 
control (managers). Since listed real estate companies commonly have dispersed stockholders, 
company owners cannot efficiently control the daily operations of the company. Thus, from 
an agency perspective, the central challenge is to align the manager’s objectives of achieving 
maximum compensation, while simultaneously mitigating personal losses to the owner’s 
interest of maximising performance (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998).  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the structure of the compensation contract should 
provide appropriate incentives for the manager to make decisions that maximise stockholder 
wealth. Therefore, the board of directors engages in arm’s-length negotiations with CEO and 
executives over compensation policies, in order to mitigate agency problems. Based on 
agency theory, executive compensation is determined primarily by company performance. 
More recent studies postulate that risk is also a determining factor in executive pay. Executives 
at riskier companies experience higher wealth uncertainty, since those companies are 
characterised by greater volatility in stock prices. Therefore, based on principal-agent theory, 
riskier companies have to offer a higher total compensation to provide a risk-averse manager 
the same incentives. (Cheng et al., 2015) 
This view is challenged by the managerial power theory of Bebchuk et al. (2002). They argue 
that boards of directors cannot be expected to bargain at arm’s length with managers, 
because a powerful CEO significantly impacts on board member decisions, especially in 
circumstances where the board of directors is relatively less independent. Since directors’ 
positions are associated with reputation, networks, and compensation, directors generally 
prefer to retain their position, and thus may negotiate compensation contracts that are more 
favourable to executives. CEOs exert a powerful influence on this re-election process and if, 
in addition, such tendencies as loyalty and collegiality prevail within boards, directors may 
comply with the CEO and approve substantial pay arrangements. (Main et al., 1995; O’Reilly 
and Main, 2010) Consequently, executives exert considerable influence on the amount of 
their own remuneration and the level of sensitivity to performance (fixed vs. variable 
compensation).  
Real estate companies provide a desirable setting for analysing both theories, since REITs are 
heavily regulated. Particularly the fact that a single shareholder cannot own more than 10 
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percent of REIT shares results in predominantly dispersed ownership within REITs. Thus, the 
role of institutional shareholders or independent directors in monitoring the company’s 
management can be accorded more importance than in other industries. Moreover, by 
focusing on a single industry, we significantly reduce company heterogeneity in terms of 
variability in performance, risk and board characteristics. In this way, examining real estate 
companies provides an interesting and valuable setting for examining the relationship 
between compensation and both performance and board characteristics. 
 
3.2.2 Determinants of CEO and Executive Compensation 
There is a growing body of literature on the determinants of REIT CEO and executive 
compensation. Most work focuses on the pay-for-performance relation, although recent 
studies also deal with the monitoring role of the board of directors. 
Hardin (1998) finds senior executive cash compensation to be determined by REIT firm size, 
senior management’s stock ownership, the amount of dividends paid to the senior executive 
and the number of years since the initial public offering. Chopin et al. (1995) model executive 
compensation as a function of size, revenue and unexpected profit, and find a positive 
relationship between REIT revenue and size, and CEO compensation. Scott et al. (2001) 
examine the impact of the market-based performance measure total shareholder return on 
REIT executives’ base salary and incentive compensation. Their findings indicate that size, 
more so than performance, is a significant determinant of the base salary, although incentive-
based compensation is highly elastic to performance. In contrast to prior research which 
applies the OLS method, Pennathur et al. (2005) apply the Tobit method to estimate the 
determinants of CEO compensation. They find that REIT CEOs who increase FFO and earnings 
per share receive larger option awards. Moreover, CEOs are rewarded with larger stock-based 
compensation schemes for riskier investments, measured by variability in returns. 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) are the first to test the role of board-of-director characteristics on 
REIT CEO compensation. Applying a simultaneous equation model, they find that CEOs receive 
higher compensation schemes in REITs where the board monitors only weakly, due to its large 
size, the presence of older directors and absence of blockholders. Consistent with prior 
research, firm size and performance, as measured by return on assets, are significant 
explanatory variables in explaining CEO compensation. Using a REIT sample from 2001, Feng 
et al. (2007) similarly include board-independence monitoring variables to investigate the 
determinants of director compensation. Their results show that higher equity-based director 
compensation is associated with improved performance. Moreover, larger firms with an 
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independent nomination committee award more equity-based compensation to directors. 
However, they find no relationship between director compensation and board size, the 
presence of outside directors, CEO duality, or CEO tenure and ownership. Similarly, Feng et 
al. (2010) focus on the relationship between the presence of institutional shareholders and 
CEO compensation. They find evidence that institutional ownership is associated with greater 
CEO option awards. Thus, institutional shareholders incentivise CEOs by establishing a pay-
for-performance link, but they also pay higher CEO cash compensation (salary + bonus). 
Using a REIT sample from 2000 till 2006, Griffith et al. (2011) are the first to apply panel fixed-
effects regression to study the impact of performance and CEO power on changes in CEO 
compensation. They find that performance, measured by shareholder total return, Tobin’s q 
and changes in FFO, does not influence CEO salary, while CEO power variables, such as CEO 
tenure and age, CEO duality, CEO stock ownership, all have significant effects. However, 
performance in addition to CEO power affects CEO option awards and finally, CEO bonuses 
are determined predominantly by performance. 
This study extends the REIT literature on executive compensation by answering the following 
research questions: First, current literature does not specify the most appropriate indicator of 
REIT management performance with regard to C-Level compensation. Do REITs apply 
contingent payment contracting relying on market-based or specific real estate performance 
measures? Second, do certain board-of-director characteristics allow CEOs to bargain for 
higher compensation levels?  
This paper adds to the literature by examining both the REIT CEO pay-for-performance 
relationship, and the validity of managerial power theory in a real estate context. We extend 
prior research by adding further corporate governance variables, such as the number of 
compensation committee meetings, a dummy indicating whether the CEO is also the founder 
of the company or the tenure of the longest-serving board member. These variables consider 
the power of different participants in the pay-setting process. Furthermore, we not only focus 
on CEO compensation, but also investigate the determinants of different types of executive 
director compensation. We are the first to investigate whether cash, long-term and equity 
compensation is adequately linked to different performance time horizons. Specifically, we 
extend the literature by using a post-financial-crisis sample, as one could argue that the extent 
of board monitoring and the pay-for-performance sensitivity changed after the crisis.  
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3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
As primary inclusion criteria for this study, sample companies had to be listed in the FTSE 
EPRA / NAREIT United States Index, which ensures a homogeneous real estate sample with 
regard to the listing criteria of size and income composition. The initial sample consists of 116 
US publicly traded real estate companies. The dataset for this study was created by using 
various sources. The CEO and executive compensation information was provided by 
ExecuComp. Financial performance data are from Compustat, SNL and Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Data on the corporate governance mechanisms were collected primarily from 
Bloomberg, and secondly from the company’s proxy statement (DEF 14A). Our dataset was 
limited by the availability of corporate governance information. In total, the final sample 
comprises 83 US listed real estate companies over the sample period 2005 to 2015. 
 
3.3.2 Variables 
Compensation Variables 
Previous pay-for-performance research commonly focuses on total CEO compensation and its 
distinct components (see Ghosh and Sirmans, 2005; Feng et al., 2010; Griffith et al., 2011). 
This study investigates both CEO compensation and that of the entire group of executive 
directors, as executives are crucial participants in daily company decision-making processes 
and therefore part of the agency problem. The group of executive directors is defined by the 
number of directors in the board holding executive positions. We focus on these executive 
positions, because executive directors are risk takers, they operate the daily business and they 
are subject of considerable media attention, in contrast to non-executive directors, who are 
responsible for advisory tasks. To analyse the pay-performance relationship from different 
time-horizon perspectives, we distinguish between short-term and long-term compensation 
components. Additionally, we construct a variable for equity compensation to evaluate 
incentive-based components. This approach yields three sets of estimates each, for CEO and 
executive directors. 
With regard to short-term compensation, this study investigates total current cash 
compensation (TCC CEO and TCC EXE), which is the sum of base salary and cash bonus for a 
fiscal year. The base salary is a fixed component of total compensation, whereas the cash 
bonus is generally dependent on previous-year performance. The second compensation 
measure includes long-term compensation components (TDC CEO and TDC EXE), and is 
calculated by the sum of base salary, cash bonus, restricted stock grants, stock options 
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granted, long-term incentive pay-outs (LTIP) and all other total. The LTIP are determined by 
company’s long-term growth plan, which generally sets performance goals for a long-term 
time horizon of 3 years or more. For each year going forward, potential rewards will be paid 
out in cash or stock, contingent on achieving the stipulated goals. The ‘all other’ total 
represent the most inclusive component in long-term compensation, comprising fringe 
benefits, other personal benefits such as company car, severance pay or relocation benefits 
and countervailing benefits. Finally, incentive-based equity compensation (EQUITY CEO and 
EQUITY EXE) is defined as the value of stocks and options granted, as reported in the 
company’s financial statements. According to ASC 718 (formerly FAS 123R), companies are 
required to disclose their equity grants at fair value. 
Performance Variables 
Company performance is measured using five different variables. First, we apply the 
accounting-based measure funds from operations per share (FFO/SHARE). Following the 
NAREIT guidelines, FFO is calculated as GAAP net profits excluding gains or losses from sales 
of properties or debt restructuring, and adding back real estate depreciation and 
amortisation. In this way, FFO might be the most appropriate performance measure in the 
real estate industry, since it serves as an improved approximation of cash flows by not 
deducting depreciation, amortisation, non-recurring revenue and expenses (Ben-Shahar et al., 
2011). The second real estate specific measure of performance is price per net asset value 
(PRICE/NAV), which represents the ratio of the market price to the book value of equity. By 
comparing the REIT’s market valuation to the net asset value, PRICE/NAV is a well-known 
valuation metric to assess if REITS are traded at a premium or discount. To capture the 
influence of current and past performance on our compensation measures, we apply total 
return to shareholders, measured in different time-horizons. Specifically, the average total 
return to shareholders over one, three or five years (TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR) might have a 
mixed relationship with short-term, long-term and equity compensation. Following previous 
literature on agency theory, the link between CEO/executive compensation and company 
performance should align management goals, such as maximising compensation, with those 
of shareholder’s, such as creating sustainable company performance. Hence, in pay-for-
performance contracts, CEO or executive compensation is a positive increasing function of 
performance. Based on agency theory, we predict that a better performing company rewards 
the CEO and executive directors with higher compensation levels, especially equity 
compensation. 
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Corporate Governance Variables 
In order to control for the distinct power mechanisms within the pay-setting process, we 
include a broad set of corporate governance variables in our model. Generally, corporate 
governance variables can be categorised either according to CEO entrenchment mechanisms 
(CEO/chairman duality, CEO/founder duality, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO ownership) or board 
control mechanisms (longest board member tenure, blockholders and institutional investors, 
independent shareholders, size of the board, number of compensation committee meetings). 
We predict that these mechanisms influence the ability of CEO’s and executives to negotiate 
higher compensation arrangements. CEO DUALITY is a proxy for the CEO being simultaneously 
chairman of the board. This power clustering in the CEO position may increase the CEO’s 
influence in pay negotiations and the nomination process of new directors (Main et al., 1995; 
O’Reilly and Main, 2010). A similarly powerful position for enforcing strategic decisions is CEO 
FOUNDER, which captures a dual role as CEO and founder of the company. We predict that 
CEO DUALITY as well as CEO FOUNDER, are positively associated with CEO/executive 
compensation.  
The age of the CEO and executive directors, as well as their length of tenure, may also be a 
determinant of strengthening managerial power. Therefore, we include CEO AGE, EXE AGE, 
CEO TENURE, as well as the tenure of the longest serving board member (BOARD MEMBER 
TENURE), in our regression models. The age of the CEO or executive directors can either be a 
proxy for working experience or an indicator of the length of time to retirement (Linck et al., 
2008; Fernandes et al., 2013). Thus, the effect of CEO or executive age on performance can 
be ambiguous. We use the CEO’s time in office (CEO TENURE) to control for the CEO’s 
managerial entrenchment. As collaboration and collegiality among board members intensify 
over time, longer tenured CEOs are expected to have more influence over board members 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). Thus, we expect a positive impact of CEO tenure on compensation. 
We also control for the tenure of the longest-serving board member, which can be an 
underestimated counterpart to the CEO tenure. Hence, a long-serving board member may 
have seniority status and be capable of convincing other board members to contradict CEO 
decisions.  
Concerning the effects of ownership variables, CEO OWN, EXE OWN, MAJORSHARE and 
INSTITUTIONALS are employed. Increased share ownership empowers CEOs or executives 
with voting rights and greater control of the company. Thus, higher CEO/executive 
shareholdings might impede external control and monitoring, which could lead to excessive 
managerial compensation packages (Ozkan, 2011). Therefore, we include the percentage of 
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shares owned by the CEO and executives (CEO OWN and EXE OWN) and expect a positive 
association with CEO/executive compensation. Ozkan (2011), as well as Griffith et al., (2011), 
find a significant non-monotonic relation between CEO/executive ownership and 
compensation. Consequently, we also include the quadratic model of these variables (CEO 
OWN², EXE OWN²) to control for a non-linear relationship.  
A key structural governance feature in constraining the power of CEOs is blockholder 
ownership. Therefore, we include MAJORSHARE to control for the percentage of substantial 
shareholders who own more than 5% percent of company’s shares. In comparison to 
dispersed shareholders, large, concentrated owners have considerable wealth at stake. 
Hence, they are motivated to actively monitor management decisions and exert influence in 
cases of poor governance. However, the unique regulatory structure of REITs inhibits the 
formation of large blockholders, since a single shareholder cannot own more than 10 percent 
of REIT shares. Thus, the role of institutional shareholders in monitoring the company’s 
management is likely to be more important than in other industries. We include 
INSTITUTIONALS, which represents the percentage of shares held by all institutional investors. 
On the one hand, since institutional investor portfolios are closely tied to the performance of 
companies they invest in, they may act as active monitors by limiting managerial power 
through their voting rights and hostile takeover threats. On the other hand, institutional 
investors may act as momentum traders by ‘voting with their feet’, instead of imposing 
disciplinary actions on management (Feng et al., 2010). We predict that higher levels of 
concentrated, or rather institutional ownership, in the case of REITS, are negatively associated 
with CEO/executive compensation. 
In the real estate sector, the presence of independent directors is also likely to be a critical 
determinant of monitoring the company’s management. By including %INDEPENDENT, we 
control for the share of independent directors on the board. Directors are considered 
independent if they are not currently employed by the company and have no other affiliations 
with it. A board composed of independent directors is supposed to ensure effective internal 
monitoring and enhanced corporate governance, since company outsiders should be less 
sensitive to the influence of corporate insiders, and free of conflicts of interest (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). However, independent directors may be less willing to challenge 
the CEO, as tendencies like loyalty and collegiality between board members evolve over time 
and directors generally prefer to retain their position within the re-election procedure (Main 
et al., 1995; O’Reilly and Main, 2010). Nevertheless, we hypothesize that independent 
directors act as efficient monitors in setting market-conform executive compensation 
arrangements and expect a negative association with CEO/executive compensation. 
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The number of directors within the board (BOARDSIZE) is also likely to raise CEO power. Larger 
boards might be ineffective in monitoring, due to a lack of mutual interaction, as well as 
internal coordination and communication problems, which may require more time and effort 
to build consensus (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Yermack, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Therefore, 
we expect these collective-action problems of larger boards to provide CEOs with more 
power, resulting in higher CEO/executive compensation. The last corporate governance 
variable is COMPMEETINGS, which is measured by the natural logarithm of the total number 
of compensation committee meetings during a fiscal year. A larger number of compensation-
committee meetings might imply disagreements on the level of compensation and a varying 
level of performance sensitivity among participants within the pay-setting process. Thus, we 
expect a negative impact of COMPMEETINGS on CEO/executive compensation. 
Firm control variables 
Given the well-documented relationship between the size of a company and compensation 
(e.g. Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Sapp, 2008), we expect a positive association 
between FIRMSIZE, measured by the natural logarithm of total company assets value, and the 
compensation level. We also include the volatility of stock returns (VOLATILITY), calculated as 
the standard deviation of weekly stock returns, in order to control for firm risk. More volatile 
companies may invest in riskier assets in the hope of higher returns. If CEOs or executive 
directors are rewarded for taking risks, we expect the impact of volatility on CEO/executive 
compensation to be positive. Finally, control variables for the company’s specific property 
type are added, since there may not only be returns variability, but also differences in the 
compensation level between various property types. These binary variables equal 1, if the 
investment focus of the company is either one of the following: RESIDENTIAL, RETAIL, 
INDUSTRIAL, OFFICE, HOTEL, HEALTH CARE or DIVERSIFIED. 
 
3.3.3 Model Specification 
Apart from corporate governance and performance variables, distinct observable and 
unobservable company, board, industry and country characteristics influence the pay-setting-
process and ultimately the C-level compensation contract. As a result, compensation 
arrangements can be determined endogenously by firm performance, or both dependent and 
independent variables can be effected by omitted unobservable characteristics at the same 
time (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). We account for this potential endogeneity problem by 
applying a panel data fixed-effects methodology with year and property-type dummies and 
using lagged performance variables in all regressions, which reduces our sample period by 
one year to 2006-2015. 
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To investigate the determinants of CEO and executive compensation, the following panel data 
fixed-effects model is estimated:  
*#, 
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where i denotes the firm, and t the year. The dependent variable Compensation refers to the 
distinct compensation types of CEO’s and executives: TCC CEO, TCC EXE, TDC CEO, TDC EXE, 
EQUITY CEO and EQUITY EXE. Performance denotes either the real-estate-specific measures 
FFO/SHARE and PRICE/NAV or the average shareholder total return over one, three and five 
years (TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR). Corporate Governance represents a broad set of CEO power 
variables (e.g. CEO DUALITY, CEO TENURE, CEO OWN) and board control variables (e.g. 
MAJORSHARE, INSTITUTIONALS, %INDEPENDENT). Firm controls refers to FIRMSIZE and 
VOLATILITY. The models include property type dummies ( to control for differences in 
compensation level between companies with a distinct property focus. )  refers to the time 
fixed-effects for the period of 2006 to 2015 and   is the error term. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 3.1, we provide the summary statistics of performance measures in Panel A, CEO’s 
and executive’s distinct compensation types in Panel B, corporate governance variables in 
Panel C and firm control variables in Panel D. Comparing the one, three and five-year total 
shareholder returns, the one-year return yields the highest average TSR1YR of 12.1%. The US 
listed real estate companies in the sample yield an average PRICE/NAV ratio of 1.66 and an 
FFO per share ratio of 2.46. Average cash compensation is $963.5 thousand for CEOs and 
$3.1 million for the group of executives. The boards of US listed real estate companies 
comprise 8.5 members on average, thereof 5.81 in executive positions. Hence, an average 
executive director is rewarded with a total cash compensation of $536.9 thousand. The CEO’s 
long-term compensation totals on average $4.40 million, which is more than double an 
average executive director’s long-term compensation of $1.90 million. The same pattern is 
evident within equity compensation arrangements (fair value of stocks and options granted), 
which values on average $2.50 million for CEOs and $1.07 million for an average executive 
director. Approximately 16.4% of the CEOs have a dual-role as CEO, and board chair and 
26.4% of the CEOs are simultaneously the company founder. The board consists of 
independent directors to the extent of two-thirds. On average, compensation committees 
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meet five times per year. The CEO is on average 56 years old. The longest tenured board 
member serves approximately 18 years, which is more than double the CEO’s tenure of 8.3 
years. The percentages of shares owned by the CEO and executive directors are negligibly 
small at 1.5% and 0.9%, respectively. Blockholders who own more than 5% of company’s 
shares, represent one third of all shareholders. Moreover, at approximately 82% share 
ownership, institutional investors are the largest shareholder group. The average total assets 
of the sample companies amount to $5.340 billion. The stock price volatility oscillates around 
4.9%. Concerning the sample property types, retail companies comprise the largest 
subsample at 27.7%. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Performance variables 
TSR1YR 853 0.128 0.121 0.393 
TSR3YR 819 0.117 0.104 0.173 
TSR5YR 785 0.114 0.106 0.133 
FFO/SHARE 817 2.170 2.457 1.571 
PRICE/NAV 850 1.411 1.660 1.186 
Panel B: Compensation variables 
TCC CEO (in $000) 804 719.616 963.503 891.176 
TCC EXE (in $000) 804 2,351.965 3,119.184 2,563.317 
TDC CEO (in $000) 801 3,159.223 4,462.725 6,531.393 
TDC EXE (in $000) 801 8,345.042 11,384.211 11,865.399 
EQUITYCOMP CEO (in $000) 771 1,500.000 2,585.002 5,586.868 
EQUITYCOMP EXE (in $000) 771 3,909.335 6,217.971 8,620.947 
Panel C: Corporate governance variables 
CEO DUALITY 860 0.000 0.164 0.499 
CEO FOUNDER 759 0.000 0.264 0441 
CEO AGE 799 54.000 55.733 8.511 
EXE AGE 799 52.000 52.268 4.700 
CEO TENURE 718 7.000 8.292 6.143 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE 844 16.000 17.760 9.588 
CEO OWN 688 0.008 0.015 0.029 
EXE OWN 709 0.003 0.009 0.024 
MAJORSHARE 853 0.347 0.341 0.141 
INSTITUTIONALS 825 0.844 0.817 0.220 
BOARD SIZE 860 8.000 8.483 2.044 
EXE 860 5.000 5.807 1.233 
% INDEPENDENT 858 0.750 0.752 0.103 
COMPMEETINGS 850 5.000 5.041 2.552 
Panel D: Firm control variables 
FIRMSIZE (in $000) 876 3,220,826 5,340,497 5,953,524 
VOLATILITY 855 4.065 4.922 2.723 
RETAIL 913 0.000 0.277 0.448 
RESIDENTIAL 913 0.000 0.145 0.352 
INDUSTRIAL 913 0.000 0.084 0.278 
OFFICE 913 0.000 0.169 0.375 
HOTEL 913 0.000 0.096 0.295 
HEALTH CARE 913 0.000 0.120 0.326 
DIVERSIFIED 913 0.000 0.108 0.311 
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics of all variables. Panel A shows our five performance variables: 
TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR, FFO/SHARE and PRICE/NAV. TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR are the average shareholder total return 
over one, three and five years. FFO/SHARE is the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the 
number of shares outstanding. PRICE/NAV is the market valuation divided by the NAV. Panel B displays the 
compensation variables for CEO and executive directors: TCC is the total current cash compensation, which is the sum 
of base salary and cash bonus for a fiscal year. TDC is the long-term compensation, and is calculated by the sum of 
base salary, cash bonus, restricted stock grants, stock options granted, long-term incentive pay-outs (LTIP) and all other 
total. EQUITY is the value of stocks and options granted, as reported in the company’s financial statements. Panel C 
shows the corporate governance variables: CEO DUALITY is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the CEO is 
simultaneously chairman of the board; CEO FOUNDER is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the CEO is 
simultaneously founder of the company; CEO AGE is the age of the CEO. CEO TENURE is the CEO’s time in office; BOARD 
MEMBER TENURE is the tenure of the longest serving board member; CEO OWN is the percentage of shares owned by 
the CEO; EXE OWN is the percentage of shares owned by the executive directors; MAJORHSARE is the percentage of 
substantial shareholders who own more than 5% percent of company’s shares; INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of 
shares held by all institutional investors; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors within the board; EXE is the number of 
executive directors within the board; % INDEPENDENT is the share of independent directors on the board; 
COMPMEETINGS is the total number of compensation committee meetings during a fiscal year. Panel D shows our firm 
control variables: FIRMSIZE is the total company assets value. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of weekly stock 
returns. The property sectors are defined by following the SNL classification: RETAIL (shopping centre, regional malls 
and other retail); RESIDENTIAL (multi-family and manufactured homes); INDUSTRIAL (logistics and self-storage); OFFICE; 
HOTEL; HEALTH CARE; DIVERSIFIED (miscellaneous). 
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Figure 3.1 depicts the development of CEO and executive director long-term compensation 
(TDC) from 2006 to 2015. Over the whole sample period, the mean of a CEO’s TDC is far 
above an average executive director’s TDC, which is not surprising, given that the CEO bears 
more responsibility. From 2008 to 2009, both TDCs decrease as a consequence of the global 
financial crisis. After 2009 and until 2015, the data show a positive trend for both TDCs. 
However, there is a huge increase in CEO TDC from 2009 to 2011, whereas the long-term 
compensation of an executive director remains moderate at roughly the same level. A more 
detailed breakdown of the different compensation components is given in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.1: Development of Long-Term CEO and Executive Compensation 
 
 
Figure 3.2 represents the main compensation components (salary, cash bonus, all others, 
stocks grants and option grants) and their relative importance during the sample period. In 
order to compare the main compensation components of a CEO’s and an average executive 
director, the compensation of the group of executive directors is divided by the average 
number of executives. The salary proportion of both CEO and an average executive director 
varies between 12% and 26%, although changes over time are marginal. Thus, this 
compensation component is not sensitive to changing market conditions or crises. 
Interestingly, for executive directors, the salary component represents a larger proportion of 
the whole compensation package than for the CEO, implying that for CEO’s, more than for 
executives, incentive-based compensation is a crucial component for aligning management 
with shareholder interests. The relative importance of a cash bonus within CEO compensation 
contracts has been more than halved from 13% in 2006 to 5% in 2015. The same pattern 
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can be observed within the executive director compensation packages. The cash bonus 
decrease can be explained by the simultaneously fundamental increase in stock grants within 
compensation arrangements. Over the whole sample period, stock grants comprise the 
largest component within compensation contracts. This finding shows that equity 
compensation is the most influential part in current C-level remuneration packages, 
suggesting that within the real estate industry, compensation packages align management 
interests with those of the company shareholders. 
 
Figure 3.2: Main Components of CEO and Executive Compensation 
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Table 3.2 provides an in-depth analysis of real estate companies’ different property sectors by 
displaying the mean-comparison results for average cash, long-term and equity compensation 
for CEO’s and for an average executive director. In our sample, the largest remuneration 
packages for CEOs as well as executive directors, are provided by companies with an office 
focus. The cash, long-term and equity compensation in the office sector is significantly 
different to the average sample compensation. Hence, in the office sector, a CEO earns on 
average $1,484,548 cash compensation and an executive director on average $839,742. Over 
all three compensation categories, CEO remuneration is approximately twice that of an 
average executive director. This result emphasises the outstanding responsibility position of 
CEO’s for the company. Similar patterns in the compensation level can be found within all 
other property-type subgroups. The second highest cash compensation, which is significantly 
different from the sample average, is paid to CEOs and executive directors in industrial real 
estate companies. Companies in the hotel sector pay the third highest CEO cash 
compensation and residential real estate companies reward the third largest executive cash 
compensation packages. CEOs hired by diversified real estate companies earn less, than the 
other property types. 
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Table 3.2: Comparison of CEO and Average Executive Director Compensation by 
Property Types 
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3.4.2 Main Regression Model 
The results of the panel fixed-effects regression with regard to the distinct compensation 
types for CEOs and executive directors are displayed in Table 3.3 - Table 3.8. To ensure that 
our coefficient estimates are not affected by multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is calculated. All VIF are below 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in 
our models. To analyse the pay-performance relationship from different time horizon 
perspectives, we distinguish between short-term and long-term compensation components. 
Additionally, we construct a variable for equity compensation, in order to evaluate incentive-
based compensation components. This approach yields three sets of estimates each for CEO 
and executive directors. All models show high explanatory power with an adjusted R² ranging 
from 0.46 to 0.72. 
Total current cash compensation 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 contain the results for cash compensation regressions TCC CEO and TCC 
EXE, respectively. The impact of performance measures shows a similar pattern for CEO’s and 
executives cash compensation. Short-term compensation arrangements are primarily driven 
by the average total return to shareholders over one year (TSR1YR). As expected, the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth in the short-term is a key determinant in explaining the 
cash salary and bonus of CEO’s and the whole group of executives. The accounting-based 
performance metric FFO/SHARE has a positive impact on CEO’s and executive directors’ cash 
compensation. However, the market-based performance metric PRICE/NAV does not 
influence the total cash compensation, neither CEO’s nor the executives’. Most of the CEO 
entrenchment mechanisms show high power in explaining CEO and executive cash 
compensation. Interestingly, CEO TENURE reveals no impact on CEO cash compensation, but 
a positive impact on executive cash compensation. As collegiality among board members may 
intensify over time, longer tenured CEOs tend to negotiate higher short-term cash 
compensation for the group of executives than merely for themselves. The tenure of the 
longest serving board member is only significant within the CEO cash compensation 
regressions. The negative coefficient of BOARD MEMBER TENURE implies that the seniority 
status of a long serving board member enables directors to fulfil an active monitoring role 
within the pay-setting process. CEO DUALITY displays an unexpected result, since the dual-
role as CEO and chairman affects both CEO and executive cash compensation adversely. Thus, 
CEOs who similarly occupy the chairman position do not exploit their power position in pay 
negotiations. However, an equally powerful position is CEO FOUNDER, which has a positive 
influence on CEO as well as executive cash compensation. Thus, within the real estate 
industry, a founder’s influence over cash compensation packages is significantly strong. In 
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line with the findings of Pennathur and Shelor (2002), older CEOs are associated with 
significantly less cash compensation. Such CEOs are probably wealthier, and thus less 
dependent on negotiating high cash compensation packages (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2005).  
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Table 3.3: CEO Total Current Cash Compensation TCC CEO 
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Table 3.4: Executive Directors’ Total Current Cash Compensation TCC EXE 
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However, the average age of executive directors does not influence executives’ cash 
compensation. In line with Griffith et al. (2011), the positive coefficient on CEO ownership 
(CEO OWN), along with the negative coefficient for the quadratic term CEO OWN², suggest 
that CEO ownership positively affects cash compensation at a declining rate. In contrast to 
Hardin (1998), who finds a positive relationship between director stock ownership and 
compensation, our coefficients on EXE OWN and EXE OWN² are insignificant. Surprisingly, 
the increase in the number of board members does not result in ineffective monitoring and 
higher CEO cash compensation, in contrast to what was demonstrated by Ghosh and Sirmans 
(2005). Our findings for BOARDSIZE show just the opposite - monitoring requires capacity and 
a less familiar environment. Group cohesion and loyalty are more likely to prevail in smaller 
boards. Contrary to our expectations, the number of compensation committee meetings has 
a significant positive impact on CEO/executive compensation, implying that compensation 
contracts might have been renegotiated upwards. Inconsistent with our expectations, but in 
line with Feng et al. (2010), independent directors have no impact on CEO or on executive 
cash compensation, therefore neither enhancing nor impairing monitoring. The impact of 
blockownership and institutional investors on the executive cash compensation is 
insignificant. However, contrary to our expectations, but in line with Feng et al. (2010), 
MAJORSHARE and INSTITUTIONALS are positively associated with CEO cash compensation. 
Implying that institutional shareholders are willing to pay higher cash compensation to retain 
CEOs (Feng et al., 2010). Moreover, the results indicate that our firm controls FIRMSIZE and 
VOLATILITY do indeed positively influence CEO’s as well as executives’ cash compensation. 
This result confirms past empirical studies that larger companies attract the best talents and 
reward management for taking risks. 
 
Total long-term compensation 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the results for the long-term compensation measures TDC CEO 
and TDC EXE. As expected, long-term remuneration packages are linked to the long-term-
orientated performance ratio TSR5YR. Besides this highly significant (p-value<0.01) long-term 
relationship between pay and performance, we similarly found a positive impact of the 
operative company profit FFO/SHARE and the market-based performance measure PRICE/NAV 
on long-term payments to CEOs and executive directors. It appears that a CEO’s and executive 
directors’ long-term compensation is rather linked to higher market valuations, since 
PRICE/NAV has a strong positive impact on TDC CEO and TDC EXE, but no impact on short-
term cash payments, as measured by TCC CEO and TCC EXE (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). 
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Table 3.5: CEO Total Long-Term Compensation TDC CEO 
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Table 3.6: Executive Directors’ Total Long-Term Compensation TDC EXE 
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Some CEO entrenchment mechanisms change their impact with regard to the long-term 
compensation components TDC CEO and TDC EXE. The two dual-role variables, CEO DUALITY 
and CEO FOUNDER lose their explanatory power when considering CEO and executive director 
long-term compensation. However, the tenure of the CEO has a positive impact on TDC CEO 
and TDC EXE. Hence, in comparison to short-term compensation, it appears that CEOs use 
their long trajectory in the C-Suite to negotiate higher long-term compensation packages for 
themselves as well as for fellow executives. We found a consistently negative impact of 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE on TDC CEO and TDC EXE, suggesting that the longest-serving board 
member plays an important role in monitoring excessive compensation arrangements. Unlike 
the results for cash compensation, we found a positive significant link between share 
ownership by executive directors (EXE OWN) and long-term compensation contracts. Through 
an increased amount of shares, executive directors use their voting rights and strategic power 
to bargain for higher long-term remuneration packages. Interestingly, there is no significant 
non-monotonic relationship for executive shareholdings and TDC EXE. The positive impact of 
institutional investors, either as a major blockholder or not, tends to be stronger on TDC CEO 
and TDC EXE. This result is in line with Feng et al. (2010), suggesting that institutional 
investors, rather than constraining generous compensation contracts, motivate management 
by paying higher long-term compensation alongside higher cash compensation. The 
explanatory power of BOARDSIZE, FIRMSIZE and VOLATILITY remains unchanged, compared 
to TCC CEO and TCC EXE. 
Total equity compensation  
Finally, the results for incentive-based equity compensation (EQUITY CEO and EQUITY EXE) are 
displayed in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. Generally, incentive-based compensation should motivate 
CEOs and executive directors to create value over a long time horizon. Consequently, we 
expect stock and option grants to be positively linked to long-term and value-driven growth. 
Our findings confirm this expectation by demonstrating that the market-based performance 
measures TSR5YR and PRICE/NAV are positively related to EQUITY CEO and EQUITY EXE. 
Additionally, medium-term performance, measured by TSR3YR, has a similarly positive impact 
on EQUITY EXE, however, the influence is marginal. Consequently, equity compensation is a 
reward for creating long-term company value. Interestingly, the proxy for CEO entrenchment 
(CEO FOUNDER) shows a negative impact on EQUITY CEO. If a CEO is simultaneously the 
company founder, it might be likely that he/she already owns a sufficient amount of company 
shares. Therefore, a CEO FOUNDER may not bargain for higher equity compensation for 
himself/herself. The impact of CEO TENURE, BOARD MEMBER TENURE, CEO OWN, CEO OWN², 
EXE OWN and EXE OWN² remains unchanged compared to TDC CEO and TDC EXE. Contrary 
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to Feng et al. (2010), who find that institutional investors use greater pay-performance 
sensitivity to align their interests with those of shareholders, we find no impact of 
MAJORSHARE and INSTITUTIONALS on equity compensation. 
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Table 3.7: CEO Total Equity Compensation EQUITY CEO 
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Table 3.8: Executive Directors’ Total Equity Compensation EQUITY EXE 
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3.4.3 Alternative Tests 
The global financial crisis began in late 2007 and revealed severe shortcomings in corporate 
governance mechanisms, especially the rewarding of managers for excessive short-term risk 
taking. The listed real estate sector provides an optimal setting for comparing time-varying 
pay-performance sensitivities, given that particularly the bursting of the real estate bubble 
was the crucial trigger for the crisis, which led to the most disastrous price falls in history. The 
timeframes are subdivided into one period displaying the core effects of the crisis from 2007-
2010 and another period from 2012-2015, which covers the recovery years after the crisis. 
The year 2011 is not included, because, as of this year, new laws induced by the crisis became 
effective, e.g. the SEC ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule. Hence, we follow Murphy (2013) by accounting for 
political factors or rather government intervention.  
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the results of pay-performance sensitivity during and after the 
financial crisis for long-term and equity compensation components of executive directors.14 
Consistent with the main model, we apply a fixed-effects panel approach and control for 
potential endogeneity by using lagged performance ratios. During the financial crisis, the 
results show no significant relationship between compensation and performance. For the 
post-crisis period, we find a positive significant impact for the performance metrics 
FFO/SHARE and PRICE/NAV on both executive remuneration types, either long-term or equity 
compensation. Compared to a non-significant pay-performance link for the crisis period 2007-
2010, the post-crisis results demonstrate an intensified pay-for-performance relationship. 
Hence, contemporary long-term and equity remuneration packages are more closely linked 
to corporate success, either cash (FFO/SHARE) or value-driven (PRICE/NAV) ratio, than during 
the crisis. 
The results for corporate governance variables and firm controls are predominately stable for 
the sub-periods. However, for equity compensation (see Table 3.10) the differential impact of 
certain variables during and after the crisis is clearly observable. Apparently, CEO FOUNDER 
as well as EXE AGE only have a significant impact during the crisis, whereas CEO TENURE gains 
explanatory power in the post-crisis period. The central monitoring role, either during or after 
the crisis, is assumed by the longest-serving board member. BOARDSIZE exclusively displays a 
negative sign in the post-crisis sub-period; hence a CEO-friendly atmosphere tended to prevail 
in small boards during the crisis. The significant coefficient of COMPMEETINGS during the 
                                                     
14 The results are the same for CEO’s long-term and equity compensation. 
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crisis period suggests that there was certainly a sufficient need for discussion concerning the 
negotiation and arrangement of compensation contracts. 
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Table 3.9: Comparison of Executive Directors’ Total Long-Term Compensation TDC 
EXE During and After the Crisis 
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Table 3.10: Comparison of Executive Directors' Equity Compensation EQUITY EXE 
During and After the Crisis 
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3.5 Conclusion  
This paper examines whether compensation packages within the real estate industry are 
determined merely by performance or also by CEO power mechanisms that have an essential 
influence on board-level negotiations about executive compensation. Especially the 
arrangement of compensation contracts after the financial crisis has so far not been assessed 
systematically. This paper aims to fill this void by analysing a comprehensive set of 
performance, CEO entrenchment as well as board-control variables, some of which have 
never been covered for the US real estate industry. Compensation arrangements were 
analysed for a sample of 83 US listed real estate companies between 2006 and 2015, the 
most comprehensive US sample to date. After controlling for a possible endogenous 
determination of compensation arrangements by applying a panel data fixed-effects 
methodology and using lagged performance variables, our findings can be summarised as 
follows: 
Total cash compensation of CEOs and executive directors is primarily driven by the 
performance ratio of total return to shareholders over one year (TSR1YR). Furthermore, several 
CEO-entrenchment and board-control proxies such as CEO DUALITY, CEO OWN, CEO OWN², 
MAJORSHARE, BOARD SIZE, COMPMEETINGS give explanatory power to TCC CEO and TCC 
EXE. Total cash compensation is similarly driven by FIRMSIZE and VOLATILITY, which confirms 
past empirical studies that larger companies attract the best talents and reward the C-Suite 
for taking risks. 
Principally, the performance ratios of total return to shareholders over five years (TSR5YR), 
operative company profit (FFO/SHARE) and the market-based performance measure 
PRICE/NAV have a significant positive impact on TDC CEO and TDC EXE. Hence, long-term 
compensation packages for CEOs and executive directors are tied to long-term company 
performance. With regard to our CEO entrenchment mechanisms, we find that CEOs exploit 
their long experience within the firm (CEO TENURE) to negotiate higher long-term pay for 
themselves, as well as for fellow executive directors. In contrast to institutional investors or 
major blockholders, the longest-serving board member assumes a leading role in monitoring 
excessive pay arrangements. In line with Feng et al. (2010), we find that institutional investors 
motivate and retain management by paying higher long-term compensation together with 
higher cash compensation. 
We also show that incentive-based compensation, such as stock and option grants, is 
positively linked to long-term and value-driven growth performance ratios (TSR5YR and 
PRICE/NAV). Consequently, equity compensation is a reward for creating long-term company 
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value. Results concerning the CEO entrenchment mechanisms remain the same as for TDC 
CEO and TDC EXE, except for the variable CEO FOUNDER, which yields a negative impact on 
EQUITY CEO. A CEO who is simultaneously the company founder, may not bargain for higher 
equity compensation for himself/herself, since he/she might already own a sufficient amount 
of company shares. Contrary to Feng et al. (2010), who find that institutional investors use 
incentive-based compensation to align management interests to those of shareholders, we 
find no impact of MAJORSHARE and INSTITUTIONALS on equity compensation.  
The analysis of two different time sub-samples subdivided into ‘during financial crisis’ (2007-
2010) and ‘after financial crisis’ (2012-2015) demonstrates impressively that the 
implementation of pay-for-performance contracts is an essential consequence of the crisis.  
In conclusion, our results reveal that the U.S. listed real estate sector has learned its lessons 
from the dramatic disaster of the financial crisis, a period of exaggerated remuneration 
packages with regard to economic incentives and short-term risk taking. CEO’s and executive 
directors’ compensation contracts should be closely linked to both short- and long-term 
performance measures, in order to align management interests with those of company 
owners. 
Further research may extend this study by investigating a sample which comprises a longer 
timeframe after the global financial crisis in order to validate whether the pay-performance 
link is sustainable. Additionally, it would be interesting to examine whether the pay-
performance link can also be found in the compensation arrangement of the middle 
management within real estate companies. 
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4 SEC Comment Letters and Information Asymmetries in REITs 
 
Abstract 
 
The SEC reviews REIT financial statements at least every three years, by adopting the 
perspective of an investor in evaluating the disclosure of REITs and asking questions an 
investor would ask. If any disclosure deficiencies are identified, the SEC sends a comment 
letter to the REIT requesting clarification, more discussion or corrections and/or improvements 
in future filings. We investigate whether SEC comment letters improve the information 
environment for REIT investors. Using a sample of 452 comment letters on annual financial 
statements (10-K) received by REITs over the period of 2006 to 2016, we show that SEC 
comments for REITs most frequently relate to assets and business transactions, operational 
results and liquidity, as well as REIT-specific non-GAAP measures such as FFO and AFFO. We 
find that SEC comment letters reduce information asymmetries, as proxied by the bid-ask 
spread, albeit with a two-quarter lag. These results are driven by SEC comments on 
accounting disclosure issues (e.g. leases and joint ventures), MD&A issues (e.g. business 
operations and liquidity) and non-GAAP metrics (e.g. FFO) issues. We also find that the 
complexity of SEC comment letters in terms of the number of comments and length of the 
comment letter correspondence between SEC and REIT have a negative impact on 
information asymmetry. Our findings show that SEC comment letters indeed enhance the 
information environment for REIT investors by forcing REITs to reveal decision-relevant 
information to the investment community. 
 
  
SEC Comment Letters and Information Asymmetries in REITs 
84 
4.1 Introduction  
The mission of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to maintain fair and efficient 
markets based on the concept that all types of investors, regardless of whether they are 
private individuals or large institutions, should have access to fundamental information about 
a firm in which they invest. The SEC aims to achieve this goal by requiring public companies 
to disclose decision-useful information to the public.15 In line with this mission and in its 
regulatory oversight function, the SEC reviews registration statements (e.g. IPO or merger 
filings) and periodic reports (e.g. annual and quarterly financial statements) of publicly listed 
firms. Such reviews can be considered a form of external, involuntary and independent 
auditing of firms. As a result of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, periodic reports of SEC 
registered firms have to be reviewed by the SEC at least every three years (Bozanic, Dietrich, 
& Johnson, 2017). The SEC states that the comment letter process “involves evaluating the 
disclosure from a potential investor’s perspective and asking questions that an investor might 
ask when reading the document.”16 
If the SEC identifies deficiencies in accounting standards and disclosure requirements in 
periodic reports, a comment letter is sent to the firm seeking clarification, requesting 
additional information and/or revisions to a firm’s disclosure in the targeted or a future filing. 
For REITs, comment letters may, for example, relate to the accounting and/or discussion of 
FFO and other non-US GAAP measures, results of operations, leases or forward-looking 
information on liquidity or business conditions in the management discussion and analysis 
(MD&A). Upon receipt of a comment letter, firms are required to submit a response to the 
SEC addressing the issues raised within a certain amount of time. This correspondence 
between SEC and firm can continue for several rounds, depending on the SEC’s satisfaction 
with the firm’s response and the severity of the comment letter issues. Generally, each follow 
up comment letter from the SEC contains fewer comments, since the targeted firm resolves 
issues over time. The SEC ends the review by filing a "no further comment" letter.17 The SEC 
comment letters and firm’s response letters are then made publicly available to the investment 
community through the SEC’s EDGAR website18.  
As a consequence, the question arises as to whether SEC comment letters help in improving 
the information environment for REIT investors and reduce information asymmetries, in line 
                                                     
15 Further information on the mission, purpose and organisational structure, see SEC website on “What We Do”: 
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html. 
16 See: SEC website on “Filing Review Process”: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
17 Further information on the comment letter review process see SEC website on “Filing Review Process”:  
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
18 Once uploaded, investors gain access to the 10-K comment letter correspondences via the EDGAR website, see: 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
SEC Comment Letters and Information Asymmetries in REITs 
85 
with the SEC mission. If the SEC requires REITs, for example, to provide more information on 
operations, performance metrics, commercial real estate market conditions, liquidity or 
business transactions, new decision-relevant information about a REIT is revealed to investors 
that is highly valuable for investment and pricing decisions. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of SEC comment letters on information 
asymmetries, as proxied by the bid-ask spread, in the REIT market. We focus particularly on 
SEC comments that are important from a REIT investor perspective. In our empirical analysis, 
we focus on comment letters relating to annual financial statements of REITs (10-Ks), as they 
represent the type of filing on which the SEC most frequently comments. Additionally, 10-K 
filings represent an important source of information for investor decision-making, considering 
that they contain information about a firm’s financial position and past performance (Griffin, 
2003), risk factors as well as forward-looking information.  
In our empirical analysis, we use a dataset of 85 REITs that received 452 comment letters with 
2,846 comment letter issues over the period of the first quarter from 2006 to the fourth 
quarter of 2016. In the first part of our analysis, we employ content analysis to provide 
insights into the types of comment that are most frequently received by REITs. The largest 
share of SEC comments in our dataset relate to the disclosure of operational, asset-specific 
(e.g. leasing), business transaction-specific (e.g. joint ventures), liquidity and performance 
measurement (e.g. FFO and AFFO) issues.  
In the second part of our analysis, we assess the impact of SEC comment letters on the 
information environment of REIT investors. In particular, we use the bid-ask spread to measure 
information asymmetries following the public release of a comment letter correspondence 
between the SEC and a REIT. We find that bid-ask spreads are reduced within two quarters 
of the dissemination of 10-K comment letter conversations to the investment community, 
which suggests that SEC comments letters indeed improve the information environment of 
REIT investors. Our analysis of individual SEC comment letter categories suggests that these 
overall results are driven by comments that are most relevant to REIT investors such as 
accounting issues (e.g. leases), MD&A issues or non-GAAP (e.g. FFO) issues. Interestingly, a 
higher complexity of SEC comment letter correspondences in terms of number of comments 
and length results in an even stronger reduction in information asymmetry.  
To the best of our knowledge, SEC comment letters have received little attention in the REIT 
literature. Adams, Hayunga, & Rasmussen (2017) touch on SEC comment letters in the context 
of REITs, as they find that investors respond negatively to restatements by REITs as a result of 
SEC comment letters and/or other interventions by regulators. Our study aims at filling this 
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gap and contributes to two streams of literature in particular. The first is the REIT information 
asymmetry literature (e.g. Anglin, Edelstein, Gao, & Tsang, 2011; Danielsen, Harrison, Van 
Ness, & Warr, 2014; Devos, Devos, Ong, & Spieler, 2018; Downs, Güner, & Patterson, 2000; 
Glascock, Hughes, & Varshney, 1998; McDonald, Nixon, & Slawson, 2000). We complement 
previous studies, which show that voluntary disclosure transparency and corporate 
governance enhance the REIT information environment (Anglin et al., 2011; Danielsen et al., 
2014), by providing evidence that the SEC comment letter review as a form of external 
involuntary auditing also improves the information environment for REIT investors. Second, 
our approach adds to the accounting and finance literature on SEC comment letters (Bozanic 
et al., 2017; Cassell, Dreher, & Myers, 2013; Johnston & Petacchi, 2017) by emphasising the 
importance of a REIT industry-specific analysis of comment letters and showing that SEC 
comment letters with regard to REIT-specific metrics (e.g. FFO and AFFO), real estate-specific 
issues (e.g. leases) and qualitative information about operations and liquidity in the MD&A 
section are most important with regard to enhancing the information environment for REIT 
investors. 
Our findings also have relevance for REIT investors, since we show that SEC comment letters 
contain valuable information about a REIT. Comment letter correspondences are a source of 
information that was created relatively recent, considering that the SEC only started to 
publicly release comment and response letters in August 200419. However, with its reviews of 
REIT filings, the SEC provides an external, free of charge auditing of REIT disclosures revealing 
deficiencies in REIT disclosure, especially on non-GAAP measures, various accounting topics 
and MD&A items. Investors may incorporate the type of information revealed in SEC comment 
letters correspondences or signals about the credibility of a REIT management revealed by the 
type and amount of SEC comments, into their decision-making process to develop investment 
strategies and price their investment risk more appropriately.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Next, we discuss the relevant literature 
and develop our hypotheses. This is followed by a description of our data, variables and 
methodology. We then present our results, which is followed by a conclusion. 
  
                                                     
19 For more information, please visit: https://www.sec.gov/answers/edgarletters.htm. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
Previous studies on corporate disclosure for non-REIT firms find that an increased level of 
disclosure improves the information environment between a firm and its investors (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Few studies use analyst forecast20 error to 
measure information asymmetries (e.g. Devos, Ong, & Spieler, 2007; Juergens, 2000). Instead, 
the majority of REIT studies applies bid-ask spreads on the basis of the following 
argumentation: The bid-ask spread reflects all costs of a stock exchange trade including an 
adverse selection component. The adverse selection component is related to information 
flows in capital markets and therefore compensates market makers for the risk of information 
asymmetry. Dealers set the bid-ask spread so that the expected gains from uninformed traders 
cover the expected losses to informed traders. (Callahan, Lee, & Yohn, 1997) Hence, the bid-
ask spread is an appropriate measure to capture information asymmetries between informed 
and uninformed investors. In this vein, Welker (1995) postulate that disclosure policy affects 
market liquidity, proxied by bid-ask spreads, since uninformed traders “price protect” against 
adverse selection. Hence, bid-ask spreads are inversely related to well-regarded disclosure 
policy. Similarly, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) demonstrate declining bid-ask spreads for 
German firms that voluntarily commit to higher levels of disclosure by switching from German 
to international reporting standards such as IAS or US GAAP.  
Over the last decade, a growing stream of accounting and audit literature has emerged that 
examines the information content of SEC comment letters on corporate filings such as IPO 
registration statements (Ertimur & Nondorf, 2006), compensation disclosures (Robinson, Xue, 
& Yu, 2011) or auditor changes (Ettredge, Johnstone, Stone, & Wang, 2011). A particular 
focus of this literature has been on periodic reports such as annual financial statements (10-
K), considering that the SEC is required to review these reports for each firm at least every 
three years in line with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Bozanic et al., 2017). 
Cassell et al. (2013) analyse the determinants of receiving a 10-K comment letter. They find 
that firms with low profitability, high volatility and complexity are more likely to obtain a 10-
K comment letter. On the contrary, strong corporate governance and engagement of a Big-
Four audit firm decreases the probability. Grove, Johnsen, & Lung (2016) construct a “red 
flag” metric to analyse the information content in 10-K comment letters and market 
performance surrounding the dissemination. The metric consists of five models, for example, 
the Altman Z-Score as bankruptcy prediction model that identifies financial problems. They 
find that firms with high red-flag metrics underperform the market and that SEC comment 
                                                     
20 Unfortunately, we had no access to analyst forecast data on e.g. FFO. 
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letters anticipate the performance for firms that exhibit such a substantial financial distress. 
The findings of Brown, Tian, & Wu Tucker (2018) suggest that SEC comment letters do not 
only impact the targeted firms disclosure quality but also that of industry peers. They examine 
spillover effects of the 10-K comment letter review by explicitly focusing on SEC comments 
with regard to risk factor disclosure. They find that firms not receiving any comment letter 
considerably modify their next year’s annual report if the SEC has commented on the risk 
factor disclosure of the industry leader, a close competitor, or various industry peers. 
Another stream of literature suggests that investors consider SEC comment letters as useful 
information for buy vs. hold decisions. Dechow, Lawrence, & Ryans (2016) and Gietzmann & 
Isidro (2013) find evidence of strategic trades of firm’s insiders and institutional investors 
surrounding the public release of SEC comment letters. Dechow et al. (2016) examine insider 
sales prior to the dissemination of comment letters concerning revenue recognition 
disclosure. They find evidence that insider trading is significantly higher than normal preceding 
the public disclosure of SEC comment letters. This negative abnormal insider trading volume 
is highest for firms with high short positions. Gietzmann and Isidro (2013) focus on trades by 
institutional investors, especially trades by low turnover or rather long-term institutional 
investors, who are assumed to monitor their investments more closely. They find that 
institutional shareholders reduce their stakes upon receipt of a SEC comment letter, and that 
these changes in holdings are especially pronounced for low turnover (better informed) 
institutional investors. 
Johnston and Petacchi (2017) as well as Bozanic et al. (2017) are two recent studies explicitly 
focusing on the impact of the SEC comment letter review on information asymmetry. 
Johnston and Petacchi (2017) analyse the impact of 10-K and 10-Q comment letters on a 
firms’ information environment proxied by the adverse selection component of the bid-ask 
spread in the quarter immediately following the public release and over a prolonged time-
frame. They find that the public release of SEC comment letters is associated with reduced 
information asymmetry in the period after the comment letter release and in the subsequent 
eight quarters. Similarly, Bozanic et al. (2017) show that firms enhance their disclosure upon 
receiving a SEC comment letter. Improvements to firms’ disclosures subsequent to a comment 
letter review are linked to a decline in information asymmetry, an increase in analyst following 
and a reduction in litigation risk. Both studies’ evidence suggests that an SEC comment letter 
review enhances the targeted firms’ information environment for investors. 
A number of studies investigate information asymmetries in the context of REITs, for example 
with regard to IPOs (Devos et al., 2018; Glascock et al., 1998) or capital distribution policies 
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(Downs et al., 2000; McDonald et al., 2000). Two recent REIT studies focus on accounting 
quality and transparency by measuring the relationship between information asymmetry and 
the quality of a REIT’s audit committee (Anglin et al., 2011) and abnormal audit fees 
(Danielsen et al., 2014). Anglin et al. (2011) show that enhanced REIT corporate governance 
diminishes the percentage bid-ask spread. Specifically, a combination of experienced board 
members and an independent audit committee with financial experts reduces the level of 
asymmetric information. Danielsen et al. (2014) employ abnormal audit fees as a measure of 
accounting disclosure transparency and find that this over-investment in audit services is 
rewarded with lower bid-ask spreads. Their evidence suggests that accounting transparency 
is most valuable to riskier REITs with greater growth options.  
4.2.1 Hypotheses 
While these earlier studies focus on internal audits (Anglin et al., 2011; Danielsen et al., 2014), 
the SEC comment letter review represents a form of external, involuntary and independent 
auditing. Considering that comment letter reviews are an independent external audit of 
financial statements by the SEC that is able to identify deficiencies in the disclosure and 
accounting practices, we assume that SEC comment letters provide additional information for 
REIT investors. In particular, we expect the dissemination of 10-K comment letter 
correspondences between the SEC and a REIT to lead to a lower level of information 
asymmetry, as measured by declining bid-ask spreads, in subsequent quarters. Therefore, we 
construct the following hypothesis: 
H1: Information asymmetry decreases subsequent to a SEC 10-K comment letter public 
release.  
Furthermore, the complexity of comment letter correspondences may have an impact on 
information asymmetry. While Johnston and Petacchi (2017) measure the informational 
consequences following the receipt of a comment letter, Bozanic et al. (2017) additionally 
analyse changes in qualitative disclosure such as length, readability, tone, numerical intensity 
or forward-looking statement intensity in the annual report filing subsequent to the comment 
letter review. Moreover, they examine the impact of negotiations, i.e. length of the 
correspondence with the SEC as measured by the number of comment letters filed by the 
SEC, on disclosure improvements in the following annual report. However, both studies focus 
on the informational consequences of the comment letter review but not on the content and 
complexity of the 10-K comment letter review itself. Contrary, studies like Cassell et al. (2013) 
and Grove et al. (2016) focus on the informational content of 10-K comment letters. Cassell 
et al. (2013) explicitly analyses the extent of comments received and the cost of remediation 
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as measured by the number of rounds and days to finalise a comment letter review. They 
show that the extent of comments received is higher for larger firms that report losses, 
engage in a small audit firm (not Big-Four) and for firms with less independent directors. 
Concerning the cost of remediation, they find that market capitalisation is positively 
associated with the number of rounds and that stock volatility, market capitalisation and 
restating financial statements are positively associated with response time. 
We combine the approach of Cassell et al. (2013) with those of Johnston and Petacchi (2017) 
and Bozanic et al. (2017) by explicitly analysing the complexity of the comment letter reviews, 
as proxied by either the number of comments, the response time or the number of rounds, 
and its association with information asymmetries. We expect that more complex comment 
letter correspondences between the SEC and the REITs management cause a stronger impact 
on information asymmetries of REIT investors. Based on the combined approach of the 
aforementioned studies we present the following hypothesis: 
H2: Information asymmetry decreases more strongly subsequent to a complex SEC 
comment letter public release. 
Lastly, we focus on comment categories specific to REITs and determine whether the decline 
in information asymmetry subsequent to a comment letter correspondence release is 
dependent on the type of comment letter issues. Prior literature shows that the effects of a 
comment letter depend on its content. Cassell et al. (2013) find evidence that accounting 
topics are more costly than non-accounting topics to remediate with regard to response time 
and the number of rounds within a SEC correspondence. Concerning comment letters on 
compensation issues, Robinson et al. (2011) categorise SEC critiques into three distinct 
categories: pay-performance, governance and readability. They find that excess 
compensation is significantly associated with comments on pay-performance and corporate 
governance but not with comments on the readability of the disclosures. Considering that 
REIT investors are most interested in decision-relevant information with regard to the past 
and future performance and financial situation of REITs as well as conditions in underlying 
commercial real estate markets, we expect comment letter categories concerning 
performance metrics for REITs (e.g. FFO or AFFO), REIT operations in the commercial real 
estate market (e.g. leases) as well as the discussion of past performance and future business 
conditions, uncertainties, trends and financial conditions in the MD&A section to be most 
important for reducing information asymmetries following the public dissemination of REIT 
comment letter correspondences.  
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Hence, we propose the final hypothesis: 
H3: Information asymmetry decreases more strongly subsequent to a SEC comment letter 
public release that contains crucial information for REIT investor decision-making. 
 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
We use Audit Analytics, which is linked to the EDGAR database, to identify all REITs that 
received at least one SEC comment letter relating to a 10-K annual report over the period of 
2004 and 2016. Since we focus on the annual report review process, we exclude all other 
comment letter filings, e.g. periodic filings 8-K and 10-Q or event filings like IPO Filing S-1 or 
Merger Filings S-4 from our dataset. The starting year of 2004 was chosen since the SEC 
began to publicly release comment letters correspondence on their filing reviews on its EDGAR 
website in June 2004. However, 10-K comment letters are only available for REITs starting in 
2006. Table 4.1 presents an overview of our sample. Our final sample includes 85 REITs with 
452 SEC comment letters. Retail REITs represent the largest share in our sample (29%) and 
received the most comment letters (30%). They are followed by REITs specialising in office 
and industrial (17 REITs and 88 comment letters) and healthcare (11 REITs and 70 comments). 
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Table 4.1: Sample Overview 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Variables 
We derive a binary variable 10KCL, which denotes the quarter of the public release of the 
respective 10-K comment letter correspondence between the REIT and the SEC. To assess 
whether the effect of SEC comment letters on information asymmetries is longer than one 
quarter, we also include indicator variables for the subsequent one (10KCL_Lag1), two 
(10KCL_Lag2), three (10KCL_Lag3), and four (10KCL_Lag4) quarters following the comment 
letter public release. 
To assess whether comment letter correspondence complexity affects information 
asymmetry, we derive three distinct variables: First, the number of comments (NoComments), 
which sums up all comments in the first 10-K comment letter filed by the SEC. Second, the 
response time (RespTime), which measures the response time in days from the receipt of the 
first comment letter by the REIT to the dissemination date of the whole conversation on the 
SEC’s EDGAR website. Third, the number of rounds (Rounds), which counts the number of 
10-K comment letters within a correspondence from the SEC, that is, the number of rounds 
from the first letter to the "no further comment" 10-K letter. We calculate three indicator 
variables set equal to one if the number of comments (Complex_NoComments), the response 
time (Complex_RespTime) and the number of rounds (Complex_Rounds) is above median. For 
our sample, the median for number of comments is 5, for response time 78 days and for 
rounds 2. We also include the one to four quarter lags of the respective complexity variable 
to account for changes in information asymmetry over time. 
        
No. of  
comment letters REITs        
Audit Analytics comment letters dataset (all file types) 
from 2004-2016   941  156        
Sample after matching with WRDS, CRPS, IBES, Ziman datasets  503  89          
10-K review sample after excluding all other filings 
(e.g. 8-K, 10-Q, S-1 or S-4) from 2006-2016 
 
452 
 
85   
       
REITs classified by property type   
Diversified    47  9 
 
Retail    136  25 
 
Residential    53  10 
 
Office / Industrial   88  17 
 
Health    70  11 
 
Lodging / Resort    41  10 
 
Other    17  3 
 
Table 4.1 shows our sample selection process and classifies the number of comment letter reviews received by 
REITs into different property types. 
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To explore comment letter categories, we classify comment letter issues in six distinct 
categories, based on the taxonomy of Audit Analytics. First, the category Accounting 
disclosure comprises deficiencies in accounting topics with regard to recurring items (e.g. 
revenues and expenses) as well as non-recurring events (e.g. mergers & acquisitions, dividend 
distributions). Second, Regulation S-K contains regulatory issues referring to standard 
guidelines and reporting requirements for various SEC filings. For example, Regulation S-K, 
Item 10(e) issues postulates that whenever one or more non-GAAP financial measures are 
included in a filing, the registrant must include various other statements in the filing. Third, 
the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) category contains comments on the 
description and analysis of a firm’s operational and financial condition. Specifically, the SEC 
comments on the discussion of earnings, results of operation, liquidity or future trends. 
Fourth, the Risk factors disclosure category provides information on the most significant risks 
that apply to the company and its securities. Fifth, the category Diverse GAAP standards and 
regulations contains diverse other regulatory filing issues based on, for example, Regulation 
S-X disclosure requirements, Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) or issues 
raised by the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF). Lastly, Audit Analytics summarises remaining 
comments in the category Other disclosure issues. This category includes, for example, 
comments on the application of non-GAAP measures.  
In addition to the Audit Analytics categories, we build a new category named NonGAAP which 
includes the non-GAAP issues assigned to the Other disclosure category and the issues on 
Regulation S-K Item 10(e) assigned to Regulation S-K in order to account for the importance 
of non-GAAP measures such as FFO and AFFO for REITs.  To create a parsimonious model for 
our empirical analysis, we reduce the dimension of the comment letter categories by defining 
seven indicator variables (Account, SKRef, MD&A, Risk, DivGAAP, OtherDIS, NonGAAP) that 
are equal to 1 if the SEC’s first 10-K comment letter contains comments in the accounting 
category, regulation S-K category, management discussion and analysis (MD&A) category, 
risk factors category, diverse GAAP standards and regulations category, other disclosure 
issues category and non-GAAP measures, respectively. Again, we also measure the long-term 
effects of the distinct comment letter issue variables and include the one to four quarter lags 
of the respective comment letter issue variable. 
We measure information asymmetry in line with previous studies (Anglin et al., 2011; 
Danielsen et al., 2014; Elizabeth Devos et al., 2018) by using the percentage bid-ask spread. 
Spread is the quarterly percentage bid-ask spread, which is calculated by the difference 
between closing bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the closing bid and ask prices. 
To obtain robust spread metrics, we follow Danielsen et al. (2014) in deleting observations 
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where the percentage bid-ask spread takes on negative values. Some previous studies on 
information asymmetries in the context of REITs further decompose the spread into its three 
parts (Downs et al., 2000; Glascock et al., 1998; McDonald et al., 2000), whereby the adverse 
selection component is one of them. We decided against this approach and measure the 
overall changes in the percentage bid-ask spread, considering that McDonald et al. (2000) 
point out that estimating spread components requires a large number of observations and 
thereby limits the sample to merely the most frequently traded REITs. Since our focus is on 
REITs receiving at least one 10-K comment letter, we cannot delete low-volume REITs from 
our sample. 
We control for a number of firm-level variables affecting bid-ask spreads in line with the 
literature.  Bhasin et al. (1997) as well as Cannon and Cole (2011) find that bid-ask spreads 
are negatively associated with trading volume and market capitalisation and positively with 
stock return volatility. Hence, we account for volatility by calculating the standard deviation 
of daily stock returns during the quarter. We control for the logarithm of market capitalisation 
as a proxy for size, since Wang et al. (1995) show that larger REITs undergo significantly less 
information asymmetry. Following Devos et al. (2018), we apply the liquidity measure 
turnover, which is defined as the logarithm of quarterly averages of daily trading volume 
divided by the quarterly average of the market capitalisation. We add the number of analysts 
following the REIT, since Danielsen et al. (2014) as well as Anglin et al. (2011) prove that the 
attention of stock market analysts reduces the bid-ask spread through enhanced information 
dissemination to investors. Finally, we include leverage, which is measured as a REITs debt 
divided by total assets. We obtain data for the control variables from CRSP, Compustat, IBES 
and ZIMAN. 
Our descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.2. Approximately 12.51% of our firm-
quarter observations represent a quarter in which SEC comment letter correspondences were 
publicly released. A SEC 10-K comment letter identifies, on average, 6 disclosure deficiencies 
(NoComments) with a range of 1 to 22 comment topics. The mean number of comment letter 
rounds is 2.55 with a range of 2 to 10 comment letter correspondences. The response time 
(RespTime) is approximately 100 days, with a range of 2 to 1,052 days. The mean percentage 
bid-ask spread is 0.13%, which is lower than the estimates reported by Anglin et al. (2011) 
and Danielsen et al. (2014), who report an average bid-ask spread of 0.28% from 2003 
through 2006 and 0.63% from 2000 through 2011, respectively. Devos et al. (2018) show 
declining percentage bid-ask spreads of 0.51% to 0.33% from 2004 to 2013. If those REITs 
are traded at the NYSE, percentage bid-ask spreads even declined from 0.23% to 0.09% 
during that period. Our sample confirms this trend of declining bid-ask spreads in REITs. 
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Turning to our control variables, REITs in our sample have, on average, a market capitalisation 
of roughly $4,582 million, which varies considerably for individual REITs from $35 million to 
$68,157 million.  The average number of analysts following is three, whereby the minimum 
number of analysts is 1 and the maximum number 9. The average volatility of stock return is 
about 0.02, turnover about 0.92% and leverage about 56%. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
  
  Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev. 
            
Panel A: Comment letter variables     
10KCL (%) 12.51 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 
NoComments 6.30 5.00 22.00 1.00 4.42 
Rounds 2.55 2.00 10.00 2.00 0.84 
RespTime 100.58 78.00 1,052.00 2.00 88.12 
      
Panel B:  Information asymmetry variable    
Spread (%) 0.13 0.07 3.72 0.01 0.23 
      
Panel C:  Control variables     
MarketCap ($ million) 4,582 2,157 68,157 34.91 6,762 
Volatility 0.02 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.02 
Turnover (%) 0.92 0.74 10.58 0.05 0.74 
Analyst 3.04 2.87 9.67 1.00 1.32 
Leverage (%) 56.09 57.22 121.39 2.43 16.65 
Table 4.2 reports the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation for comment letter (Panel A), 
information asymmetry (Panel B) and control variables (Panel C). 10KCL is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the firm-quarter observation is a 10-K comment letter public release event. NoComments is the sum of all 
comments in the first 10-K comment letter filed by the SEC. RespTime is the response time (days) from the 
receipt of the first comment letter by the REIT to the dissemination date of the whole conversation on the 
EDGAR website. Rounds is the number of 10-K comment letters within a correspondence from the SEC, that 
is, the number of rounds from the first letter to the "no further comment" 10-K letter. Spread is the quarterly 
percentage bid-ask spread, which is calculated by the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided by 
the midpoint of the closing bid and ask prices. MarketCap is the quarterly average of the equity value of the 
REIT. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the quarter. Turnover is the quarterly 
average of daily trading volume divided by the quarterly average of market capitalization. Analyst is the number 
of analysts following the REIT. Leverage is the REITs total debt divided by total assets. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. 
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Table 4.3 presents the correlations between bid-ask spreads, our comment letter and control 
variables. The release of a SEC comment letter correspondence has a negative correlation 
with the bid-ask spread in the quarter of its public release (10KCL) and in the first 
(10KCL_Lag1), second (10KCL_Lag2) and fourth (10KCL_Lag4) quarter after the 
dissemination. These correlations are in line with our expectations and provide initial evidence 
that the release of comment letters has a relationship with information asymmetries. Larger 
firms (LogMarketCap) with higher liquidity (LogTurnover) and an increased number of analysts 
following (Analyst) exhibit reduced bid-ask spreads. Moreover, highly levered and volatile 
REITs show increased bid-ask spreads and hence a higher level of information asymmetry. The 
highest correlation coefficient of 0.59 is reported between analyst coverage and market 
capitalisation and the second largest of 0.58 between the liquidity variable turnover and stock 
return volatiliy. 
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Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix 
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4.3.3 Model Specification 
Our empirical analysis has two components. Considering that this is the first investigation into 
SEC comment letters in the context of the REIT industry, we first conduct a comment letter 
content analysis to provide insights into the amount and types of comments received by REITs 
from 2006 to 2016. Then, we assess the change in information asymmetry surrounding the 
dissemination of a 10-K comment letter correspondence in a multivariate regression 
framework. In particular, we define the event window as the quarter in which a 10-K 
comment letter was publicly released and the subsequent four quarters to measure long-term 
effects. We employ fixed-effects regression with robust standard errors, which are valid in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of arbitrary forms to estimate our model 
in Equation 1. Furthermore, a diagnostic test for multicollinearity is performed. All explanatory 
variables have variance inflation factors (VIF) below 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is not 
a problem in this regression analysis. 
5#, =   +    4, +   , +  ( +  ) + 6 +    ,       (1) 
Where i denotes the firm, t the year (2006-2016),  ( refers to firm fixed-effects, ) to time 
fixed-effects for the years 2006 to 2016, 6 to seasonal fixed-effects for the respective 
quarters within a fiscal year and ɛ represents the error term. Comment letter measure is a 
proxy for (1) the public release quarter of the 10-K comment letter correspondence (10KCL), 
(2) the public release quarter for each of our comment letter complexity variables 
(Complex_NoComments, Complex_RespTime, Complex_Rounds) and (3) the public release 
quarter for each of our comment letter content categories variables (Account, SKRef, MD&A, 
Risk, DivGAAP, OtherDIS, NonGAAP).  
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Content Analysis 
The comment letter issues identified by the SEC can be assigned to six distinct categories 
based on their content: accounting disclosure issues, other disclosure issues, regulation S-K 
issues, management discussion and analysis (MD&A) issues, risk factors disclosure issues and 
diverse GAAP standards and regulations issues. Table 4.4 presents an overview of SEC 
comments received by REITs for each of the categories from 2006 to 2016. The overall 
number of comments increased from 161 in 2006 to 544 in 2010 before declining to 112 in 
2016. It seems that the SEC started reviewing REIT financial statements more thoroughly 
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during the financial crisis, i.e. in 2008, and that after 2010 REITs might have learned from SEC 
comment letter reviews in prior years and improved their disclosure and accounting practices, 
which resulted in fewer SEC comments. All comment letter categories show this trend except 
for “diverse GAAP standards and regulation”, which already includes 57 comment letter issues 
in year 2006. This category summarises remaining standards and especially includes SFAS 
GAAP comments, which provide guidance on a specific accounting topic only up to 2009.  
For the entire period, REITs received the most comments for accounting disclosures issues 
(962), followed by other disclosure issues (599), diverse GAAP standards (555), regulation S-
K references (363), MD&A disclosure issues (341) and risk factors (26). Comments in the 
accounting disclosure category relate to the accounting of, for example, leases, property and 
business transactions. The “other disclosure issues” category includes non-GAAP measures 
and director compensation. Considering that REIT-specific performance metrics such as FFO, 
AFFO and Funds Available for Distribution (FAD) are non-GAAP measures, the large amount 
of SEC comments in this category suggests that the disclosure for these measures is not 
satisfactory from a SEC point of view. Interestingly, the low number of comments on risk 
factors discussed in REIT financial statements suggests that, from an SEC point of view, REITs 
sufficiently and comprehensively present their risk factors. As a consequence, we ignore risk 
factor-related comments in the remainder of our investigation. 
Table 4.4: Overview of SEC Comments Received by REITs 
 
  
Year Accounting 
disclosure 
issues 
Other 
disclosure 
issues 
Regulation 
S-K references 
MD&A 
disclosure 
issues 
Risk factors 
disclosure 
issues 
Diverse 
GAAP 
standards 
N 
2006 56 28 14 6 0 57 161 
2007 68 35 15 9 0 76 203 
2008 96 63 48 27 3 75 312 
2009 94 44 35 30 3 82 288 
2010 142 112 125 59 9 97 544 
2011 113 59 26 58 3 49 308 
2012 114 89 25 76 4 40 348 
2013 126 56 22 42 3 27 276 
2014 64 28 23 21 0 25 161 
2015 47 44 16 11 1 14 133 
2016 42 41 14 2 0 13 112 
Total 962 599 363 341 26 555 2,846 
Table 4.4 shows the number of comments in the six distinct comment letter categories as defined by Audit 
Analytics during our sample period. 
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Table 4.5 provides a detailed content analysis of SEC comment letters received by REITs. We 
present the top five comment letter issues for the categories accounting disclosure issues, 
other disclosure issues, regulation S-K issues and MD&A issues. We do not display the 
categories risk factors disclosure as well as diverse GAAP standards and regulations, as the 
former is negligible for REITs (see Table 4.4) and the latter contains diverse other regulatory 
filing issues, which relate to the formal structure rather than the content of an annual report. 
Column 2 displays the Audit Analytics (AA) issue identifier, column 3 the description of the 
comment letter issue, column 4 shows the absolute number of comment issues in each 
category, column 5 the percentage share of each issue within its respective category and 
finally column 6 the percentage share of each issue with regard to the overall number of 
comments (2,846 sample total).  
In the category for which REITs received the most comments, accounting disclosure issues 
(Panel A), 140 comments related to leases and leasehold including sale-and-lease-back 
transactions for real estate. The SEC may, for example, request clarification or more discussion 
with regard to the disclosure of how leasing, development or construction costs were 
capitalised or how capital expenditures were treated (Deloitte, 2015). Fair value accounting 
issues are the second most frequent type of comments with 69 comments. Another frequent 
comment relates to consolidation, i.e. the accounting of off-balance sheet arrangements, 
structure investment vehicles and special purpose entities (65 comments). The SEC may, for 
example, request clarification on how a REIT determined whether they have a controlling 
interest in a joint venture or additional disclosure of joint venture information (Deloitte, 2015). 
REITs received 60 comments relating to the accounting of investments in subsidiaries and 54 
relating to mergers, acquisitions and other business combinations. 
In Panel B (other disclosure issues), 188 comments relate to non-GAAP measure issues. FFO, 
AFFO and EBITDA are common examples for non-GAAP measures scrutinised by the SEC. For 
REITs, the application of FFO is common practice as it is standardised by the National 
Association of REITs (NAREIT). The SEC accepts FFO as a real estate industry-wide non-GAAP 
standard measure for the operating performance21, however, some SEC comments focus on 
clarifying any inconsistencies between the FFO disclosed by a REIT and the NAREIT definition 
(Usvyatsky, 2015). Considering that REITs commonly adjust FFO in various ways to, for 
example, normalised FFO, core FFO or the adjusted FFO (AFFO), SEC comments may request 
more clarifications on whether an adjustment is non-recurring or request changes to the label 
of metrics in future filings (Usvyatsky, 2015). The SEC also comments on inconsistencies 
                                                     
21 See SEC compliance and disclosure interpretations on non-GAAP financial measures: 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/nongaapinterp.htm. 
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between performance measures reported in other disclosures such as press releases or 
earnings calls and the respective measure in the financial report (Deloitte, 2015). 
The most common issues with regard to Regulation S-K are presented in Panel C. Regulation 
S-K specifies reporting requirements for publicly listed companies. In this category, the SEC 
may, for example, request financial statements with regard to property acquisitions or 
clarification on the policy to determine whether an acquisition is an asset purchase or business 
acquisition (Deloitte, 2015). Regulation S-K, Item 10(e) issues relate to non-GAAP measures 
by requiring a thorough discussion on why displaying a non-GAAP financial measure provides 
useful information to investors. This S-K item also requires firms to reconcile the difference 
between the applied non-GAAP measure and the most comparable GAAP measure. For our 
sample, REITs received 68 comments on this issue. Moreover, SEC comments on the report 
(34 comments) and discussion (23 comments) of executive compensation in the Regulation 
S-K category.  
Lastly, Panel D presents the most frequently received SEC comments with regard to the 
qualitative MD&A section. With 88 comments, the discussion of operational results by 
management received the most frequent comment. It is followed by comments regarding 
liquidity issues (68 comments), executive compensation (56), critical accounting policies and 
estimates (39) and business overview issues (36). Comments by the SEC with regard to the 
MD&A section may, for example, request more information on lease rollover trends, 
differences between existing rents and current market rents to better understand the future 
and current performance of REITs, leasing statistics or lease renewal information such as 
square footage leased, average rents or leasing costs. With regard to liquidity and capital 
resources, the SEC may require a REIT to disclose information that allows investors to evaluate 
future distributions by a REIT with regard to cash resources, borrowings or other sources of 
financing as well as associated risks. (Deloitte, 2015)  
Overall, Table 4.5 shows that the SEC indeed takes on the perspective of a REIT investor and 
most frequently comments on commercial real estate asset-related issues (e.g. leases), real 
estate business transactions (e.g. joint ventures), REIT-specific performance measures (e.g. 
FFO), business operations and liquidity issues with regard to the distributions. The SEC 
requesting more clarification, discussion and/or disclosure of quantitative and qualitative 
information in REIT financial statements enhances the information environment of REIT 
investors by providing them with more decision-useful information, some of it previously 
being private information, to understand the current and future performance of a REIT.  
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Table 4.5: Comment Letter Content Analysis Results 
Part 1 
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Table 4.5: Comment Letter Content Analysis Results 
Part 2 
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4.4.2 Main Regression Model 
Next, we present the results of our fixed-effects regression for the binary variable 10KCL, 
indicating the public dissemination of a comment letter correspondence, and the bid-ask 
spread in Table 4.6. In Model 1, we control for firm-fixed effects while in Model 2, 3 and 4 
we also control for seasonal and/or year fixed-effects. Irrespective of the model specification, 
10KCL_Lag2 has a significant negative coefficient. Thus, we can confirm our first hypothesis 
that SEC comment letters reduce information asymmetry for REIT investors. More specific, 
two quarters after a REIT-SEC comment letter correspondence was publicly released, the bid-
ask spread is reduced. One explanation for this lag is that, following SEC comment letters, 
REITs improve their disclosure practices and release additional information or file 
restatements. Thus, the reduction of the bid-ask spread may be a result of this additional 
information being released to the REIT investor community. Another explanation is that, 
compared to shorter corporate disclosures such as earnings press releases, SEC comment 
correspondences are relatively lengthy and complex. Investors may need a certain amount of 
time to process the information contained in it, which explains the two-quarter lag. We 
conduct several robustness checks regarding the two-quarter lag. First, we examine different 
timeframes before, during and after the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and find a robust two-
quarter lag for all subsamples. Moreover, analysing subsamples for our distinct property types, 
namely residential, retail, office, health, lodging and diverse also yields a robust two-quarter 
lag for each sub-sample. 
Concerning our control variables, the key determinants of the bid-ask spread show the 
anticipated sign. As expected, volatility increases information asymmetry and bid-ask spreads 
through increased uncertainty. Larger REITs as measured by their market capitalisation have 
fewer information asymmetries and are associated with reduced bid-ask spreads. Increased 
liquidity, as measured by the variable turnover, decreases information asymmetry. Increased 
analyst coverage reduces bid-ask spreads and therefore appears to enhance information 
environment for investors. However, this impact is not robust when controlling for year effects 
(model 3 and 4). Leverage has no impact on the spread. The two opposing effects of leverage 
on the bid-ask spread may explain the insignificant relationship. Anglin et al. (2011) points 
out that highly leveraged firms are scrutinised more thoroughly by the capital markets 
(negative effect) and in contrast, higher leverage and subsequently less equity financing 
reduce the incentive to disseminate information to investors (positive effect). 
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Overall, our results in Table 4.6 suggest that SEC comment letters indeed improve the 
information environment for REIT investors and reduce information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors, albeit with a two-quarter lag. Thus, we provide evidence 
that SEC comment letters are effective in providing REIT investors with a higher quality and 
quantity of information, in line with the SEC mission.  
 
Table 4.6: Fixed-Effects Regression Results for Comment Letters Overall 
 
 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.0024 (1.49) 0.0022 (1.35) 0.0045** (2.36) 0.0042** (2.21) 
10KCL -0.0001 (-1.31) -0.0001 (-1.01) -0.00005 (-0.46) -0.00002 (-0.18) 
10KCL_Lag1 -0.0001 (-1.38) -0.0001 (-0.97) -0.00002 (-0.22) 0.000002 (0.02) 
10KCL_Lag2 -0.0002*** (-3.18) -0.0003*** (-3.32) -0.0002** (-2.08) -0.0002** (-2.29) 
10KCL_Lag3 -0.0001 (-1.31) -0.0002 (-1.51) -0.0001 (-0.54) -0.0001 (-0.67) 
10KCL_Lag4 -0.0002* (-1.73) -0.0001 (-1.46) -0.0001 (-0.61) -0.00003 (-0.36) 
LogMarketCap -0.0005*** (-3.32) -0.0004*** (-3.24) -0.0007*** (-3.50) -0.0007*** (-3.43) 
Volatility 0.0523*** (6.25) 0.0532*** (6.36) 0.0481*** (5.64) 0.0488*** (5.74) 
LogTurnover -0.0003** (-2.28) -0.0004** (-2.45) -0.0003** (-2.13) -0.0004** (-2.25) 
Analyst -0.0002*** (-4.64) -0.0002*** (-4.87) -0.00004 (-0.96) -0.00005 (-1.09) 
Leverage 0.0006 (1.18) 0.0007 (1.23) -0.0004 (-0.86) -0.0004 (-0.79) 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal effects  Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes Yes 
F-statistic 22.27 21.63 22.62 22.02 
R² 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 
Adj. R² 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.41 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the fixed effects regressions. Column 1 includes firm effects, column 2 firm and seasonal effects, 
column 3 firm and year effects and column 4 all three effects. The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage bid-ask Spread 
(calculated by the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the closing bid and ask prices). The 
independent variables of special interest are 10KCL (indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm-quarter observation is a 10-K comment 
letter public release event) as well as 10KCL_Lag1, 10KCL_Lag2, 10KCL_Lag3 and 10KCL_Lag4 (indicator variables for the 
subsequent one, two, three and four quarters following the comment letter public release). We include the following controls: 
LogMarketCap is the logarithm of the quarterly average of the equity value of the REIT. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns during the quarter. LogTurnover is the logarithm of the quarterly average of daily trading volume divided by the quarterly 
average of market capitalization. Analyst is the number of analysts following the REIT. Leverage is the REITs total debt divided by 
total assets. The sample consists of 3,261 quarterly REIT spreads from Q1 2006 to Q4 2016. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
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4.4.3 Alternative Tests 
In Table 4.7, we present our results with regard to the effect of the complexity of a SEC 
comment letter correspondence on information asymmetry. Column 1 displays the regression 
results (firm, seasonal and year fixed-effects) for comment letters with an above median 
number of comments (Complex_NoComments), Column 2 for above median response time 
(Complex_RespTime) and Column 3 for an above median number of rounds 
(Complex_Rounds). The results for our complexity variables are in line with the results in Table 
4.6. In particular, for REITs with an above median number of comments, an above median 
response time to SEC comments and an above median-amount of SEC-REIT-correspondence 
rounds, bid-ask spreads experience a significant reduction two quarters after the public 
release of the SEC comment letter correspondence. For REITs with an above median-amount 
of rounds, the release of the SEC comment letter correspondence also has an immediate 
effect on bid-ask spreads in the release quarter. Hence, our second hypothesis, stating that 
complex SEC comment letters exert a stronger impact on the information environment of REIT 
investors, holds especially true for (Complex_Rounds). One explanation for this immediate 
effect may be that it signals information about a REIT and its management to investors before 
they even had the opportunity to review the SEC comment letter correspondence in detail. 
Future studies may use our result as a starting point to further investigate a potential signalling 
effect, for example from the number of pages of a correspondence, or other explanations.  
Our results in Table 4.7 suggest that the effects of SEC comment letters on information 
asymmetries are largest for REITs that have a higher number of disclosure issues, as indicated 
by the number of SEC comments, and take longer, in terms of time and rounds, to resolve 
the issues. This indicates that the information environment around these REITs, prior to SEC 
comments, was characterised by a lower quantity and/or quality of information and higher 
information asymmetries, which makes the SEC comment letters so useful to investors.  
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Table 4.7: Fixed-Effects Regression Results for Comment Letter Complexity 
 
  
 NoComments RespTime Rounds 
Intercept 0.0046** (2.32) 0.0046** (2.32) 0.0046** (2.33) 
Complex_NoComments -0.000001 (-0.01)   
Complex_NoComments_Lag1 -0.00004 (-0.35)   
Complex_NoComments_Lag2 -0.0002** (-2.52)   
Complex_NoComments_Lag3 0.0001 (0.35)   
Complex_NoComments_Lag4 0.00003 (0.22)   
Complex_RespTime  0.00003 (0.15)  
Complex_RespTime_Lag1  -0.0001 (-0.86)  
Complex_RespTime_Lag2  -0.0002*** (-2.73)  
Complex_RespTime_Lag3  -0.0001 (-0.33)  
Complex_RespTime_Lag4  0.0001 (0.48)  
Complex_Rounds   -0.0002** (-1.99) 
Complex_Rounds_Lag1   -0.0001 (-1.10) 
Complex_Rounds_Lag2   -0.0002** (-2.03) 
Complex_Rounds_Lag3   0.0001 (0.29) 
Complex_Rounds_Lag4   0.0001 (0.85) 
LogMarketCap -0.0007*** (-3.49) -0.0007*** (-3.5) -0.0007*** (-3.49) 
Volatility 0.0483*** (5.64) 0.0482*** (5.63) 0.0481*** (5.69) 
LogTurnover -0.0003** (-2.17) -0.0003** (-2.20) -0.0003** (-2.2) 
Analyst -0.0001 (-1.24) -0.0001 (-1.23) -0.0001 (-1.28) 
Leverage -0.0005 (-0.94) -0.0005 (-0.94) -0.0005 (-0.92) 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 21.62 21.63 21.65 
R² 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Adj. R² 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Table 4.7 presents the results of the fixed effects regressions for complex comment letters. The dependent variable is the quarterly 
percentage bid-ask Spread (calculated by the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the closing bid 
and ask prices). The independent variables of special interest are in column 1 Complex_NoComments (comment letters with an above 
median number of comments, Median = 5 comments) as well as Complex_NoComments_Lag1, Complex_NoComments_Lag2, 
Complex_NoComments_Lag3, Complex_NoComments_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three and four quarters 
following the complex comment letter public release as measured by the number of comments). In Column 2 Complex_RespTime 
(comment letters with an above median number of response time, Median = 78 days) as well as Complex_RespTime_Lag1, 
Complex_RespTime_Lag2, Complex_RespTime_Lag3, Complex_RespTime_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three 
and four quarters following the complex comment letter public release as measured by the response time). In Column 3 Complex_Rounds 
(comment letters with an above median number of rounds, Median = 2 rounds) as well as Complex_Rounds_Lag1, 
Complex_Rounds_Lag2, Complex_Rounds_Lag3, Complex_Rounds_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three and 
four quarters following the complex comment letter public release as measured by the number of rounds). We include the following 
controls: LogMarketCap is the logarithm of the quarterly average of the equity value of the REIT. Volatility is the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns during the quarter. LogTurnover is the logarithm of the quarterly average of daily trading volume divided by the 
quarterly average of market capitalization. Analyst is the number of analysts following the REIT. Leverage is the REITs total debt 
divided by total assets. The sample consists of 3,261 quarterly REIT spreads from Q1 2006 to Q4 2016. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. 
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Lastly, we present the results of our fixed-effects regression for individual comment letter 
categories in Table 4.8. While we estimated our model in Equation 1 for all comment letter 
categories, we only present the results for categories with significant coefficients. In 
particular, we find a significantly negative impact on the bid-ask spread of the second quarter 
(Account_Lag2) after the comment letter public release containing accounting disclosure 
issues, which predominantly relates to leases, fair value accounting, consolidation and 
investments in subsidiary businesses (Table 4.5). Our results are in line with Cassell et al. 
(2013), who find that accounting topics in 10-K comment letters have a special informational 
value and are more costly to remediate.  
Interestingly, comment letters relating to MD&A issues not only enhance the information 
environment in the second quarter after the public release (MD&A_Lag2), but also in the third 
(MD&A_Lag3). Hence, the negative effect of MD&A-related SEC comments on the bid-ask 
spread prevails over a longer period. Within our sample, 46% of comments in the MD&A 
category focus on result of operations and liquidity issues (Table 4.5). Considering that these 
key investment criteria are important for the decision-making of REIT investors, SEC comments 
requesting more clarification, discussion or additional information enhance the information 
environment for REIT investors.  
Lastly, we present the results for non-GAAP issues in comment letters. The variable NonGAAP 
combines the issues raised in the category Other disclosure issues (AA ID 813: Non-GAAP 
Measures) and in the category Regulation S-K (AA 762: Regulation S-K Item 10(e)). The third 
lag of NonGAAP (NonGAAP_Lag3) has a significantly negative coefficient suggesting that bid-
ask spreads are reduced three quarters after a SEC comment letter correspondence with non-
GAAP comments was publicly released. One explanation for the three-quarter lag is that REITs 
improve on their non-GAAP metrics in the next quarterly financial statement (10-Q), which 
then provides investors with improved performance-related information and reduces 
information asymmetry among investors. With regard to our last hypothesis, the findings of 
the detailed comment letter type analysis (Table 4.8) confirm that the improvement of investor 
information quality depends on the disclosure deficiencies found, as represented by the type 
of comment in the SEC comment letter review. Specifically, SEC comment letters on 
accounting disclosure issues, MD&A issues and non-GAAP metrics issues present crucial 
information to investors. Considering that comments in these categories relate most 
frequently to assets and business transactions, operational results and liquidity as well as REIT-
specific non-GAAP measures such as FFO and AFFO, our results show that the SEC comment 
letter review process is highly valuable to investors, as REITs are forced to provide more 
detailed information that is valuable for their investment and pricing-decisions.  
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Table 4.8: Fixed-Effects Regression Results for Individual Comment Letter Categories 
 
 
  
 Account MD&A NonGAAP 
Intercept 0.0042** (2.21) 0.0042** (2.20) 0.0042** (2.21) 
Account -0.000004 (-0.04)   
Account_Lag1 -0.00002 (-0.21)   
Account_Lag2 -0.0002** (-2.34)   
Account_Lag3 -0.00003 (-0.27)   
Account_Lag4 -0.00001 (-0.06)   
MD&A  0.00002 (0.10)  
MD&A_Lag1  0.0001 (0.73)  
MD&A_Lag2  -0.0002** (-2.30)  
MD&A_Lag3  -0.0001** (-2.10)  
MD&A_Lag4  -0.00004 (-0.37)  
NonGAAP   -0.0001 (-1.36)  
NonGAAP_Lag1   0.0001 (0.75) 
NonGAAP_Lag2   -0.00004 (-0.44) 
NonGAAP_Lag3   -0.0002* (-1.93) 
NonGAAP_Lag4   0.0001 (0.55) 
LogMarketCap -0.0007*** (-3.43) -0.0007*** (-3.44) -0.0007*** (-3.45) 
Volatility 0.0487*** (5.72) 0.0488*** (5.72) 0.0488*** (5.76) 
LogTurnover -0.0004** (-2.24) -0.0004** (-2.23) -0.0004** (-2.27) 
Analyst -0.00005 (-1.07) -0.00005 (-1.07) -0.00005 (-1.09) 
Leverage -0.0004 (-0.79) -0.0004 (-0.78) -0.0004 (-0.83) 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 22.02 22.03 22.01 
R² 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Adj. R² 0.41 0.41 0.41 
Table 4.8 presents the results of the fixed-effects regressions for the comment letter content variables. The dependent variable is the 
quarterly percentage bid-ask Spread (calculated by the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the 
closing bid and ask prices). The independent variables of special interest are in column 1 Account (indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
SEC’s first 10-K comment letter contains comments in the accounting category) as well as Account_Lag1, Account_Lag2, 
Account_Lag3, Account_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three and four quarters following the accounting 
category comment letter public release). In Column 2 MD&A (indicator variable equal to 1 if the SEC’s first 10-K comment letter 
contains comments in the MD&A category) as well as MD&A_Lag1, MD&A_Lag2, MD&A_Lag3, MD&A_Lag4 (indicator variables 
for the subsequent one, two, three and four quarters following the MD&A category comment letter public release). In Column 3 
NonGAAP (indicator variable equal to 1 if the SEC’s first 10-K comment letter contains comments on non-GAAP measures) as well as 
NonGAAP_Lag1, NonGAAP_Lag2, NonGAAP_Lag3, NonGAAP_Lag4 (indicator variables for the subsequent one, two, three and four 
quarters following the non-GAAP comment letter public release). We include the following controls: LogMarketCap is the logarithm 
of the quarterly average of the equity value of the REIT. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the quarter. 
LogTurnover is the logarithm of the quarterly average of daily trading volume divided by the quarterly average of market capitalization. 
Analyst is the number of analysts following the REIT. Leverage is the REITs total debt divided by total assets. The sample consists of 
3,261 quarterly REIT spreads from Q1 2006 to Q4 2016. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 
and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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4.5 Conclusion  
As part of its mission to improve the information environment for stock market investors, the 
SEC regularly reviews REIT financial statements and, if disclosure deficiencies are found, 
requires REITs to address them, by providing more discussion, clarification or corrections 
and/or improvements in future filings. REITs have to submit a response letter within a certain 
timeframe, outlining how they have addressed the SEC comment(s). The comment letter 
correspondence between the SEC and a REIT is publicly released once the REIT has 
satisfactorily addressed the SEC comments. We investigate whether SEC comment letters 
enhance the information environment for REIT investors. In particular, we focus on annual 
financial statements (10-K) and investigate whether information asymmetries, proxied by the 
bid-ask spread, are reduced following the public release of SEC comment letter 
correspondences. Considering that the SEC adopts an investor perspective when reviewing 
and commenting on REIT filings, we particularly investigate the effect of comments that are 
the most relevant to REIT investors with regard to REIT operations, assets and performance 
metrics.  
Using a sample of SEC comment letters for REITs over the period of 2006 to 2016, we find 
that bid-ask spreads are reduced two quarters after the public release of a 10-K comment 
letter correspondence between a REIT and the SEC. These results are driven by SEC comment 
letters on accounting disclosure issues (e.g. leases, joint ventures), MD&A issues (e.g. business 
operations, liquidity) and non-GAAP metrics (e.g. FFO) issues. Furthermore, we find that the 
reduction in information asymmetry is largest for REITs with an above median number of 
comments, above median response time (days to finalise the 10-K comment letter review) 
and above median number of rounds (number of letters within a particular correspondence 
from the SEC). Our results suggest that SEC comment letters indeed enhance the information 
environment of REIT investors as they force REITs to disclose more information regarding 
assets and business transactions, operational results and liquidity as well as REIT-specific non-
GAAP measures such as FFO and AFFO.  
One shortcoming of our study is that we do not investigate the actual mechanisms by which 
comment letters reduce information asymmetries following the public release of SEC 
comment letter correspondences. The effect we identify could be explained with REITs 
improving their disclosure quality in subsequent financial statements and/or releasing a 
restatement following the release of an SEC comment letter correspondence. Another 
explanation may be that investors review SEC comment letter correspondences and derive 
information about an individual REIT from them, which then impacts on trading and pricing 
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decisions. While an analysis of these mechanisms is beyond the scope of our study, we 
encourage future investigations to use our findings as a starting point for such investigations. 
These studies may, for example, investigate REIT characteristics that make a REIT more or less 
likely to receive comment letters. In this context, one could apply topic modelling (e.g. LDA: 
latent dirichlet allocation algorithm) to identify topics covered in 10-Ks and match them with 
SEC comment letters in order to predict the probability of a comment letter receipt in future 
fiscal years. Moreover, it would be interesting to analyse how SEC comment letters, as a form 
of external auditing, interact with corporate governance, institutional investor ownership and 
other forms of external monitoring. These studies may also investigate the reaction of REIT 
investors to SEC comment letters and what information they signal about the credibility of 
REIT management.  
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5 Conclusion 
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 showed that incentive misalignment, short-term risk taking 
and corporate behaviour incompliant with U.S. policy makers’ regulations or good corporate 
governance practises, discredited the financial industry as a whole. However, the crisis 
triggered a rethinking process and paradigm change in investor decision-making and hence 
intensified sensitivity towards corporate governance and transparency problems. Accordingly, 
an increasing number of investors now not only focuses on financial returns, but also 
considers environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors as important investment 
criteria. The aim of this study is to evaluate current corporate governance topics, namely 
gender diversity, pay-for-performance contracts and enhanced disclosure by adopting an 
investor’s perspective. In this way, the present thesis adds to the real estate literature on 
corporate governance (e.g. Bauer, Eichholtz, & Kok, 2010; Feng, Ghosh, & Sirmans, 2005; 
Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003; Kohl & Schaefers, 2012) by first analysing whether women in 
leadership can be considered a corporate governance factor and second by examining 
managerial entrenchment in the context of compensation arrangements. Additionally, an 
analysis of SEC comment letters and their impact on the information environment of REIT 
investors is conducted, thereby extending the literature on corporate disclosure and 
transparency with regard to the US REIT industry (e.g. Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Diamond 
& Verrecchia, 1991; Kohl & Schaefers, 2012; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Welker, 1995). 
The following section provides a summary of the respective articles in this dissertation, 
addressing the motivation, research design and key findings of each paper. The thesis 
concludes with general remarks and an outlook for further research on the managerial aspects 
of listed real estate companies. 
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5.1 Executive Summary 
 
Paper 1: Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: 
Evidence from US REITs 
 
The article on gender diversity in US REITs is the first to identify the determinants explaining 
the presence of women on the board of directors, and to study the relationship between 
gender diversity and financial performance in a US REIT context. Considering the unique legal 
setting of the REIT sector, the effectiveness of both corporate governance and the impact of 
gender-diverse boards is expected to differ from that of companies from other industries. 
Since no five or fewer shareholders are entitled to own 50% of the company, extensive 
external monitoring through large blockholders is impaired with respect to REITs (Feng et al., 
2005), and internal monitoring structures gain importance. If diverse boards enhance internal 
monitoring (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), gender diversity in senior leadership positions may be 
a decisive corporate governance factor within REITs, for which extensive external monitoring 
through large blockholders is weakened. Moreover, the absence of quota legislation in the 
US market constitutes the US REIT sector as an unbiased setting for analysing the link between 
gender diversity and REIT performance. In this way, this article extends the corporate 
governance literature on listed real estate companies (e.g. Bauer, Eichholtz, & Kok, 2010; 
Feng, Ghosh, & Sirmans, 2005; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2005; Kohl & Schaefers, 2012) by analysing 
potential benefits of female leadership.  
 
A two-stage Heckman (1976) approach is applied to a unique panel dataset of 112 US Equity 
REITs over the period from 2005 to 2015. To control for endogeneity within the gender 
diversity / performance relationship, the first step involves determining the factors that impact 
on a real estate company’s female representation. The results show that institutional investors 
and independent board members have a positive impact on female board appointments. In 
the REIT context, where extensive external monitoring through large blockholders is weaker 
than in other industry sectors, independent shareholders and institutional investors may 
expect women to enhance internal monitoring, and thus they do support gender-diverse 
leadership teams. 
The second step of the Heckman (1976) procedure includes a performance analysis, which 
provides evidence of a U-shaped relationship between gender diversity in executive positions 
and price per net asset value (PRICE/NAV). In the case of REITs, a critical mass of female 
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executives is reached at approximately 30% representation. This finding holds especially for 
real estate sectors with a strong consumer orientation and a high proportion of women in 
the workforce, such as retail and health care. When differentiating between types of 
performance, the results provide evidence that gender diversity has a positive effect on market 
performance (PRICE/NAV), but not on accounting-based performance (FFO/SHARE). Hence, 
investor perceptions drive the positive effect of female directors on performance. However, 
gender diversity evidently has no impact on operating performance. In sum, the findings 
constitute a strong case for gender diversity by demonstrating that investors currently pay 
increased attention to gender diversity in their investment decisions.  
 
 
Paper 2: The Determinants of Executive Compensation in  
US REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
 
This study is the first to systematically assess REIT CEO and executive director compensation 
contracts after the financial crisis, while considering government interventions like the ‘Say-
on-Pay’ reform of 2011. In detail, the article investigates whether REIT CEO and executive 
director compensation packages are determined by performance and/or by managerial 
entrenchment. A large number of studies have examined the pay-for-performance 
relationship in the context of REITs using pre-crisis data (e.g. Feng, Ghosh, He, & Sirmans, 
2010; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2005; Griffith, Najand, & Weeks, 2011; Pennathur, Gilley, & Shelor, 
2005). Moreover, a comprehensive set of CEO entrenchment (e.g. CEO tenure, CEO 
ownership) and board-control mechanisms (e.g. longest board member tenure, institutional 
investors) is applied, some of which have never been covered for the US real estate industry. 
To control for a possible endogenous determination of compensation arrangements, a panel 
data fixed-effects methodology with lagged performance variables is applied to a sample of 
83 US REITs between 2006 and 2015. By explicitly distinguishing between different time-
horizon perspectives on compensation, the results are threefold: First, the short-term total 
current cash compensation (base salary and cash bonus) of CEOs and executive directors is 
driven primarily by the performance ratio of total shareholder return over one year. Second, 
long-term compensation packages (base salary, cash bonus, restricted stock grants, stock 
options granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other total) for CEOs and executive 
directors are tied to long-term performance, as the total return to shareholders over five years, 
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as well as the real estate specific metrics FFO/SHARE and PRICE/NAV, have a significant 
positive impact. Third, incentive-based compensation (value of stocks and options granted) is 
positively linked to long-term and value-driven growth performance ratios. These results are 
driven by the period after the financial crisis (2012-2015). However, during the financial crisis 
(2007-2010), no pay-performance link can be found. 
With regard to the board-control variables, the findings suggest that institutional investors, 
rather than cutting back on generous compensation contracts, attempt to motivate 
management appropriately by paying higher long-term compensation alongside higher cash 
compensation. Moreover, the longest-serving board member plays an important role in 
monitoring excessive compensation arrangements. Additionally, ineffective monitoring is 
likely in smaller boards, where a familiar environment and loyalty rather result in higher 
compensation packages. 
In conclusion, this study provides evidence that the U.S. listed real estate sector has learned 
its lesson from the disasters of the financial crisis. As a consequence of the crisis, CEO and 
executive director compensation contracts are now linked to both short- and long-term REIT 
performance to align management interests with those of REIT investors. 
 
 
Paper 3: SEC Comment Letters and Information Asymmetries  
in REITs 
 
The purpose of the third article is to analyse the impact of SEC comment letters on information 
asymmetries in the REIT market. Such letters can be considered a form of external audit, since 
the SEC regularly reviews REIT financial statements and, if disclosure deficiencies are found, 
requires REITs to address them, and finally, these comment letter reviews are released to the 
public. Considering that the SEC adopts an investor perspective when reviewing REIT filings, 
this study focuses particularly on the effects of comments that are most relevant to REIT 
investors. This is the first paper that analyses whether SEC comment letters contain valuable 
information for REIT investor decision-making. On the one hand, the findings add to the REIT 
information asymmetry literature (e.g. Anglin, Edelstein, Gao, & Tsang, 2011; Danielsen, 
Harrison, Van Ness, & Warr, 2014; Devos, Devos, Ong, & Spieler, 2018; Downs, Güner, & 
Patterson, 2000; Glascock, Hughes, & Varshney, 1998; McDonald, Nixon, & Slawson, 2000) 
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by investigating the impact of SEC comment letter reviews on the information environment 
of REIT investors. On the other hand, the study extends the accounting and finance literature 
on SEC comment letters (e.g. Bozanic, Dietrich, & Johnson, 2017; Cassell, Dreher, & Myers, 
2013; Johnston & Petacchi, 2017) by emphasising the importance of REIT industry-specific 
metrics. 
The dataset for the empirical analysis comprises 85 REITs that received 452 comment letters 
with 2,846 comment letter issues on their annual financial statements (10-K Form) over the 
period of 2006 to 2016. In the first part of the analysis, content analysis is employed to 
provide insights into the types of comments that are most frequently received by REITs. The 
largest share of SEC comments relate to the disclosure of operational, asset-specific (e.g. 
leasing), business-transaction-specific (e.g. joint ventures), liquidity and performance 
measurement (e.g. FFO and AFFO) issues. 
In the second part of the analysis, a panel data fixed-effects approach is applied to assess the 
impact of SEC comment letters on the information environment of REIT investors, proxied by 
the bid-ask spread. The results show that bid-ask spreads are reduced within two quarters of 
the dissemination of 10-K comment letter conversations to the investment community. The 
analysis of individual SEC comment letter categories suggests that overall results are driven 
by comments that are most relevant to REIT investors such as non-GAAP (e.g. FFO) issues. 
Furthermore, the findings show that a higher complexity of SEC comment letter 
correspondences, in terms of length and number of comments, results in an even stronger 
reduction in information asymmetry. 
To sum up, the results suggest that SEC comment letters indeed enhance the information 
environment of REIT investors, as they force REITs to disclose more information regarding 
asset and business transactions, operational results and liquidity, as well as REIT-specific non-
GAAP measures such as FFO and AFFO. 
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5.2 Final Remarks and Further Research 
In recent years, there has been a growing demand for transparency and disclosure by both 
U.S. policy makers and investors. Hence, ensuring compliance with regulatory provisions and 
sustaining investor confidence poses a major challenge for REIT management. This 
dissertation provides guidance on how REIT management can implement well-regarded and 
appropriate corporate governance mechanisms with regard to gender diversity in executive 
positions and adequate compensation regimes. Moreover, the deficiencies identified in REIT 
periodic reports by the SEC comment letter reviews may help REIT management to improve 
REIT disclosures over time.  
The first article of this dissertation on gender diversity in US REITs shows that REIT 
management can increase the likelihood of a female board appointment by featuring certain 
board characteristics, namely an increased presence of institutional investors and independent 
board members. Moreover, REITs can enhance their market performance (PRICE/NAV) by 
increasing the percentage of women in executive positions. Hence, investors consider female 
leadership as a signal of enhanced corporate governance and thus develop a higher demand 
for REITs which promote gender diversity. Future research could extend the diversity analysis 
to female participation at the middle-management level. It would also be useful to analyse 
the relationship between a REIT’s performance, corporate social responsibility ranking and 
female representation. Such an investigation would further shed light on the 
interdependences between these mechanisms. Moreover, the REIT corporate governance 
literature would benefit from an investigation of further diversity dimensions, such as race, 
religion and age. As proposed by Schrand & Just (2018), who analyse diversity in educational 
real estate project groups, an investigation of work-related diversity characteristics such as 
work experience, professional background and ability would contribute to a comprehensive 
understanding of diversity. 
The article on executive compensation in US REITs - paper two - finds evidence that the U.S. 
policy makers’ ‘Say-on-Pay’ reform was effective. As a consequence of the crisis, and the 
resulting ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule, the REIT management implemented pay-for-performance 
contracts by linking compensation packages to both short- and long-term performance, as 
well as value-driven growth. Additionally, this article shows that certain board-control 
mechanisms can alleviate managerial entrenchment. Specifically, a small board with a long-
serving board member (long tenure) is effective in monitoring excessive compensation 
arrangements. Future research could extend this study by investigating a sample which 
comprises a longer timeframe after the financial crisis, in order to validate whether the pay-
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performance link is sustainable. Furthermore, a deeper analysis of the compensation 
components with regard to, for example, the distinct structure of long-term incentives or 
deferred pay-outs might be of considerable interest. However, the availability of such detailed 
data, which also limited the scope of this study, will remain a challenge for future research. 
The last article of this dissertation yields evidence that SEC comment letters indeed enhance 
the information environment of REIT investors, as they reveal deficiencies in REIT disclosure, 
especially on operational, asset-specific (e.g. leasing), business transaction-specific (e.g. joint 
ventures), liquidity and performance measurement (e.g. FFO and AFFO) issues. Hence, REIT 
management must be aware of the fact that these external audits by the SEC are read by 
investors and might be utilised in future investment and pricing decisions. This study 
constitutes a starting point for future investigations into SEC comment letters in the context 
of the REIT industry. Future studies may, for example, investigate REIT characteristics that 
make a REIT more or less likely to receive comment letters. In this context, one could apply 
topic modelling (e.g. LDA: latent dirichlet allocation algorithm) to identify topics covered in 
10-Ks and match them with SEC comment letters in order to predict the probability of a 
comment letter receipt in future fiscal years. Moreover, it would be interesting to analyse how 
SEC comment letters, as a form of external auditing, interact with corporate governance, 
institutional investor ownership and other forms of external monitoring. These studies could 
also investigate the reaction of REIT investors to SEC comment letters and derive trade 
strategies based on the information content of comment letters. 
This dissertation underscores the importance of well-regarded and widely accepted corporate 
governance and disclosure policies. In this way, the work sheds light on how a REIT’s 
management should position and best prepare itself with regard to gender diversity in 
executive positions, incentive alignment in compensation packages and external audits of 
disclosure by the SEC. 
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